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“[T]hat a trade-mark right is not limited in its enjoyment by
territorial bounds, is true only in the sense that wherever the
trade goes, attended by the use of the mark, the right of the
trader . . . will be sustained.”
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918).

“The law of trademarks rests upon territoriality.”
3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 20:26, at 20-163 (2d ed. 1950).

“The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law . . . .”
Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

“[T]he Paris Convention . . . recognizes the principle of the
territoriality of trademarks.”
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 29:25, at 29-67 to 29-68 (4th ed. 2004).

“[Our holding] is consistent with the fundamental doctrine
of territoriality upon which our trademark law is presently
based.”
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d
617, 628 (4th Cir. 2003).

I.

INTRODUCTION

As these contemporary and historical statements suggest, it
is an axiomatic principle of domestic and international
trademark law that trademarks and trademark law are
territorial. Yet recently some scholars have suggested that “the
territorial model of trademark law . . . is an anachronism” in the
global market.1 This paper critiques the principle of territoriality
in four ways. First, I suggest that statements about trademark
territoriality, though largely unquestioned, mask a variety of
related propositions. Territorial philosophies separately affect
rules regarding the scope of rights, applicable legal norms, and
the acquisition and enforcement of rights. Disaggregating the
“principle of territoriality” into its component parts, and
1. Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998).
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separately analyzing the doctrines that implement the principle,
enables a more nuanced assessment of the ways in which the
principle might be modified in an era of global trade.
In particular, it becomes apparent that different rules of
trademark law possess a territorial character for different
reasons. For example, common law trademark rights are
territorial because the intrinsic purpose of trademark law
suggests extending (and limiting) rights to the geographic reach
of goodwill. In contrast, registration systems designed to promote
economic expansion derive their territorial character from their
grounding in economic policymaking, effected by institutions that
focus on the regulation or development of discrete economic
regions. And rules regarding the enforcement of trademark
rights assume their territorial quality because of their connection
to political institutions with territorially defined sovereignty.
Thus, some aspects of territoriality are rooted in social and
commercial practices that dictate the reach of a brand, while
other aspects are a function of political or policymaking
authority. In an era of global trade and digital communication,
social and commercial practices are less territorially confined and
less commensurate with the nation-state. But economic
policymaking and political institutions may prove more resistant
to change than social or commercial behavior.
Second, I argue that although the principle of trademark
territoriality has nominally remained constant (with only minor
blips and exceptions2) since the conclusion of the Paris
Convention3 over one hundred years ago, recent developments at
both the national and international level suggest that the
principle may have a different intensity today. Some U.S. courts
appear willing to modify traditional principles and doctrines to
reflect the increasingly cross-border nature of goodwill. The most
notable judicial revisions have involved the “use in commerce”
prerequisite to the award of U.S. rights, the well-known mark
doctrine that protects foreign brands, and the conditions under
which courts will grant relief with extraterritorial effects. The
courts in question have acted, sometimes explicitly, largely to
avoid domestic consumer confusion that would not be likely to
occur absent all of the signature features of global life—increased
international travel, satellite and Internet communication, and
global trade—although one decision does reflect a concern for
protecting foreign producers’ ability to expand into the United
2. Refer to Part II infra.
3. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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States.
Internationally, instruments have been adopted to protect
producer interests in expanding trade by facilitating the grant of
trademark protection on a broader territorial basis (with or
without registration) and to minimize the costs of international
trade by harmonizing substantive trademark norms. But truly
international norms are directly applicable only in the field of
cybersquatting disputes, and efforts to deviate from national
models of enforcement have likewise taken root only in that
narrow context.
Third, the paper begins an investigation of the ways in
which the principle of territoriality should be revisited in light of
the globalization of markets and concomitant changes in modern
marketing practices. Given the multidimensional nature of the
territoriality principle, different territoriality-based rules might
be more or less appropriate subjects for reform. Thus, some
overarching reconfiguration of “the principle” would be unwise
and perhaps impossible. Instead, the paper analyzes several
discrete developments. This analysis encompasses both revisions
to the territorial model that have recently occurred (such as
liberalization of the ability to obtain U.S. rights without use in
the United States and enlargement of international mechanisms
to obtain registrations on a multinational basis) and proposals
for reform that are being resisted (such as efforts to facilitate the
consolidation of multinational trademark claims in a single
proceeding).
Some shared dilemmas can, however, be derived from these
discrete inquiries. Thus, scholars and policymakers need to
consider whether the territorial character of a rule reflects the
intrinsic purpose of trademark law and is thus rooted in social
practices that are already in flux. The character of these
doctrines will almost inevitably mutate as the notion of
territoriality evolves in line with social change. Such revisions
will swim with the current of socially constructed territoriality.
If, however, the territoriality of a doctrine instead mirrors the
national nature of economic and political institutions, then
efforts to revise the doctrines will first require altering the
underlying institutional and policymaking apparatus. Moreover,
I suggest that in deciding whether particular territorial aspects
of trademark law warrant reassessment, it is important to bear
in mind a choice that trademark law frequently encounters but
that is rarely mentioned. That is, should trademark law be
structured
reactively
to
protect
whatever
consumer
understandings or producer goodwill develops, or should it
proactively seek to shape the ways in which consumers shop and
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producers sell or seek to acquire rights, thus shaping how the
economy functions?
For example, judicial revision of different U.S. doctrines that
make it easier for foreign producers to secure protection in the
United States without using the mark there may sacrifice
producer interests in order to protect a small domestic consumer
population (which travels abroad to partake of foreign services).
Considering only the consumer protection side of the equation
provides an incomplete picture of territorially related
considerations. The costs to producers of deferring wholly to
cross-border consumer goodwill in defining the scope of rights
may outweigh the gains of reduced domestic confusion. The
marketplace may become cluttered with marks of uncertain
scope. At the very least, a complete analysis of how to revise the
territorial nature of rights requires that the tradeoff between
trademark law as a consumer protection regime and trademark
law as an instrument of economic policy be explicitly explored.
International developments that bolster domestic trends
toward recognition of well-known marks without use in the
United States were adopted (unlike the domestic judicial
decisions) primarily to serve the interests of producers. But these
developments too might ultimately come to hinder global
marketing by cluttering the trademark marketplace in ways that
are not transparent to producers or users. In contrast,
international instruments designed to confine the legal effects of
a mark’s use online to a limited number of territories appear well
targeted at the cluttering problem. And deviations from the
traditional model of trademark acquisition at the international
level (i.e., centralized mechanisms to facilitate national
registration, sometimes in advance of developing goodwill) are,
by these same measures, almost wholly beneficial. Thus, I
suggest that any revisions to the territorial model focus on
targeted adjustments to the national model to reflect changes in
the (cross-border) territoriality of goodwill. A full analysis of any
reform must reflect objectives of territoriality rooted in both
social and political values.
Finally, the concluding parts of the paper briefly highlight
the extent to which, in implementing an appropriate commitment
to the principle of territoriality, there is, or should be, an
assimilation of the “territorial” and the “national.” In a world of
burgeoning international trademark law, the suggestion that
trademark rights are territorial often finds practical expression
in the notion that trademark rights are national. Although the
two are often spoken of interchangeably, identification and
analysis of the choices facing trademark law might be better
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achieved by consciously separating the two. In particular,
recognition of the territoriality of goodwill is linked to the basic
purposes of trademark law, namely, the preservation of that
goodwill and the protection of consumers. Nationality-grounded
doctrines, seen particularly in the context of acquisition and
enforcement of rights, are more likely driven by economic policy
and by institutional issues such as the practical demands of
current political structures. Recognizing this distinction would
assist in highlighting for policymakers that doctrines reflecting
premises connected to the national nature of institutions are
likely to remain relatively fixed and will in the short term be
substantially immune to the revolution we are witnessing in
social norms. This grounding in nationality makes these
doctrines more stable and less amenable to reform, and
emphasizes that, with respect to these doctrines, we will first
have to modify political structures—whether judicial or
administrative—if reform is to be imagined.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY
Trademark law is territorial in part because the
foundational intellectual property conventions of the late
nineteenth century, the Paris Convention and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property,4
were built around the principle of national treatment.5 As a
general rule, a signatory state was obliged to offer protection to
nationals of other signatory states that matched the protection
afforded its own nationals.6 And this principle, carried forward
and consolidated in the TRIPS Agreement,7 is seen as a corollary
to the principle of territoriality—in a world of different
trademark laws, lines are drawn according to place and not
citizenship.
4. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The first version of the Berne
Convention was concluded in 1886.
5. See Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 2; Berne Convention, supra note 4, art.
5, 1161 U.N.T.S. at 35–36.
6. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, 1161 U.N.T.S. at 35.
7. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, art. 3, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81,
85 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Indeed, the only trademark law thus far found
by a WTO dispute settlement panel to violate the TRIPS Agreement did so on the basis
that it denied national treatment (and also violated most-favored nation obligations). See
United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, World Trade
Organization Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R, para. 60 (Jan. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter WTO Appellate Body Report].
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But trademark law is not unique in its territorial character
and might have assumed this character absent international
conventions. Much law is territorial. This is true for many
reasons, reasons that have consumed international lawyers and
legal theorists for centuries. Historically, the principal divide was
between laws that attached to the person, wherever that person
traveled, and laws that regulated according to the place where a
relevant legal event occurred. Scholars of private international
law have for many years offered a variety of theories advocating
one approach over the other and over time have developed rules
that allocate some legal questions to the law of the person and
8
others to the law of the place. Trademark law is firmly in the
latter category.
The attractions of territoriality are clear. Law is contextual,
9
and geography is an important part of context. Territorial
regulation of conduct comports in some sense with intuitive
notions of appropriate prescriptive authority, embodied in the
aphorism “when in Rome, do as the Romans do.” And territorial
regulation might also be supported for practical or pragmatic
reasons such as the relative ease of enforcing domestic judgments
and comity-grounded concerns of reciprocal overreaching.
Without rehearsing more fully the claims of territoriality as a
governing principle of the reach of law,10 it is clear that courts
and scholars justifying the territoriality of trademark law have
resorted to some of the same arguments that are advanced in
other fields of law.11
As I will explain in greater detail below, however, there are
additional reasons that explain the territorial character of
trademark law. Some flow from the intrinsic nature and purpose
of trademarks; others reflect the shape of economic policymaking;
and yet others reflect the structure of political institutions used
to administer and enforce trademark law. For present purposes,
it is sufficient to note that it is in some sense hardly radical to
find that trademark law is territorial.
In trademark law, the principle of territoriality is a vessel
8. See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 34–40
(1993) (discussing Savigny’s theories); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 19–25 (1834). See generally Symeon Symeonides, Territoriality and Personality,
in INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF PETER NYGH 405 (Talia Einhorn & Kurt Siehr eds., 2003).
9. See Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and Geography, in LAW
AND GEOGRAPHY, 5 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2002, at 3, 3–4 (Jane Holder & Carolyn
Harrison eds., 2003).
10. See generally Symeonides, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 638–40, 647 (2d
Cir. 1956) (discussing the reasons for the territorial scope of the Lanham Act).

(6)DINWOODIEG5

2004]

10/11/2004 12:02 PM

TRADEMARKS AND TERRITORY

893

for a variety of related propositions. These different propositions
have a territorial component for different reasons. As a result,
whether the territorial character of each proposition is waning
(Part III of the paper) or should be revisited (Parts IV–V of the
paper) might be answered differently for each. Thus, this Part of
the paper outlines the different aspects of trademark law in
which the principle of territoriality finds expression. Territorial
philosophies inform rules regarding the scope of rights,
applicable legal norms, and the acquisition and enforcement of
rights.
A. Territoriality of Rights
Historically, within the United States, trademark rights
have been defined territorially. At common law, this proposition
has been affirmed on more than one occasion by the U.S.
Supreme Court, most notably in two early twentieth century
cases12 that presented very similar facts.13 The later case, United
14
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., was a contest between two
geographically remote users of the same mark for similar
products. The Court held that the trademark rights of the senior
user of the mark (from Massachusetts) did not extend to
Louisville, Kentucky, where the junior user, without knowledge
of the senior user’s mark, had in fact been the first to use the
mark.15 Indeed, not only could the Louisville producer continue
its use of the mark, but it could exclude the senior user from the

12. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100–01 (1918); Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916). The principles articulated by the
Court in these cases have been followed in cases involving common law rights enforced in
federal court under Lanham Act § 43(a). See, e.g., Accu Pers., Inc. v. AccuStaff, Inc., 846
F. Supp. 1191, 1205 (D. Del. 1994); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26:4, at 26-9 to 26-10 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
cases).
13. The principal difference between the two cases was that the rival producers in
United Drug had begun to compete in the same region, whereas the senior user in
Hanover Star Milling acted preemptively in asserting national rights. This difference
might be relevant to questions of relief in other contexts. Refer to text accompanying
notes 304–06 infra (discussing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d. 358
(2d Cir. 1959)).
14. 248 U.S. 90.
15. Id. at 101.
[W]here two parties independently are employing the same mark upon goods of
the same class, but in separate markets wholly remote the one from the other,
the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant, unless at least it
appear that the second adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical
to the interests of the first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of
his goods, to forestall the extension of his trade, or the like.
Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415.
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Louisville market.16 That is, the Court recognized the coexistence
of two trademarks, each defined by, inter alia,17 the territory in
which the respective mark was used.
Defining the scope of trademark rights territorially flowed
logically from the intrinsic purpose of trademark law. In the
Louisville area, customers associated the mark in question with
the Kentucky producer alone.18 Whether viewed as an instrument
to preserve producer goodwill or to protect consumers against
confusion, the purpose of trademark law was served by
recognizing rights in the local producer.19 The theoretical nature
of trademark rights pointed in the same direction. The
Massachusetts merchant could have no rights in Louisville
because “[t]here is no such thing as property in a trade-mark
except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade
in connection with which the mark is employed,” and the
merchant in question had previously had no business or trade in
Louisville.20 Stated differently, trademarks are merely the vessels
for a legally protectable interest, namely, goodwill, and the scope
of that protectable interest thus defines the scope of trademark
rights.21
Of course, identifying the legally protectable interest does

16. Strictly, the Court did not grant that relief, as there was no counterclaim filed
by the Louisville company. See United Drug, 248 U.S. at 99, 104. If such relief had been
sought, it would clearly have been granted. See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare
Communications, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 733 (8th
Cir. 2001) (recognizing the right of the junior user nationally to exclude the senior user
from the local area in which the junior user was the first to use).
17. Any complete definition of the scope of the trademark rights in question would,
of course, have to take into account other variables such as the product in connection with
which the mark was used. At common law, the limits on the scope of trademark rights are
essentially a function of the products upon which the mark is used and the geographic
area in which the mark is used. Although this paper focuses on changes in the relevance
of the geographic variable, expansion of the types of actionable consumer confusion and
the adoption of federal dilution laws have, in recent years, also radically revised the force
of product limits on the scope of rights.
18. United Drug, 248 U.S. at 95.
19. See id. at 100–02.
It would be a perversion of the rule of priority to give it such an application in
our broadly extended country that an innocent party who had in good faith
employed a trade-mark in one State, and by the use of it had built up a trade
there, being the first appropriator in that jurisdiction, might afterwards be
prevented from using it, with consequent injury to his trade and good-will, at the
instance of one who theretofore had employed the same mark but only in other
and remote jurisdictions . . . .
Id. at 100.
20. Id. at 96–97.
21. To some extent, this is recognized in the effective definition of “remote” provided
by the United Drug Court, namely, that “the mark means one thing in one market, an
entirely different thing in another.” Id. at 100.
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not automatically answer the question regarding the geographic
reach of trademark rights. Defining the scope of goodwill is itself
a challenge. Must the producer claiming rights in a particular
locale have sold goods bearing the mark in that area, or possess
customers in that area? Is it sufficient that the mark is known, or
has a reputation, in that area?22 The Massachusetts merchant in
United Drug would, in any event, have satisfied none of these
standards vis-a-vis Louisville.23 Instead, the merchant’s
argument rested on the factually unsupported claim that it had
24
continually expanded its business where financially possible.
The Court rejected that fact, even if proved, as a basis for
trademark rights:
[T]he adoption of a trade-mark does not, at least in the
absence of some valid legislation enacted for the purpose,
project the right of protection in advance of the extension of
the trade, or operate as a claim of territorial rights over
areas into which it thereafter may be deemed desirable to
extend the trade. And the expression, sometimes met with,
that a trade-mark right is not limited in its enjoyment by
territorial bounds, is true only in the sense that wherever
the trade goes, attended by the use of the mark, the right of
the trader to be protected against the sale by others of their
25
wares in the place of his wares will be sustained.
Thus, the area in which the mark was used was the central
determinant of the geographic reach of rights, as indeed one
26
might expect in a use-based trademark system. In the United
22. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. b (1995) (noting
that “[t]he geographic scope of priority extends beyond the area in which the prior user
has actually used the mark if the user’s association with the mark is known to prospective
purchasers in other areas”). This spectrum of possibilities can be framed as an inquiry
into what amounts to use of the mark, but might also be conceived, within the language of
United Drug, as whether the users are truly “remote.” This inquiry has been submerged
in a welter of doctrine, such as the “market penetration” test. See Nat’l Ass’n for
Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732,
735 (8th Cir. 2001); Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383,
1398–99 (3d Cir. 1985) (listing factors for courts to consider in determining whether
market penetration is sufficient to confer trademark protection).
23. See United Drug, 248 U.S. at 96.
24. Id. at 96–97.
25. Id. at 98.
Into whatever markets the use of a trade-mark has extended, or its meaning has
become known, there will the manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by
an infringing use be entitled to protection and redress. But this is not to say that
the proprietor of a trade-mark . . . can monopolize markets that his trade has
never reached and where the mark signifies not his goods but those of another.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916).
26. The doctrine articulated by the Court in United Drug and Hanover Star Milling,
known as the “Tea Rose doctrine” in recognition of the products at issue in Hanover Star
Milling, also rested in part on the good faith of the geographically remote junior user.
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States, trademark rights are acquired by, and dependent upon,
use; under United Drug, the metes and bounds of the rights
acquired are defined by use, with respect to both the products
upon which they are used and the territory in which they are
used.27
This approach makes the question of what amounts to “use”
crucial to the geographic scope of trademark rights, as will be
28
discussed more fully below. The lower courts, prompted by
language in the earlier U.S. Supreme Court case, Hanover Star
Milling v. Metcalf,29 also developed doctrines designed to grant
the first producer greater leeway in claiming rights beyond the
area of actual use. In particular, some courts recognized that
there existed a “zone of natural expansion” that permitted the
senior trademark owner to exercise rights both in the area in
30
which it used the mark and in the zone of natural expansion.
But these doctrines were in large part alternative vehicles for
judicial reconfiguration of the central question, namely, how to
31
define “use,” which in turn would define the scope of rights.
These reconfigurations, which effectively broadened the
geographic scope of rights beyond the area of actual use, reflected
practical concerns linked to the social desirability of encouraging
economic expansion. Similar impulses regarding the benefits of
economic expansion eventually motivated congressional action,
32
though through a different device. When the United Drug Court
United Drug, 248 U.S. at 101; Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 419. Thus, much case
law developed on the meaning of what amounted to good faith. Refer to note 101 infra
(discussing conflicting interpretations of “good faith”). This consideration in part reflects
the roots of trademark law in broader principles of unfair competition. See Hanover Star
Milling, 240 U.S. at 413 (“[T]he common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader
law of unfair competition.”).
27. United Drug, 248 U.S. at 98.
28. Refer to Part III.A infra (discussing the “use” requirement).
29. 240 U.S. at 420 (“We are not dealing with a case where the junior appropriator
of a trade-mark is occupying territory that would probably be reached by the prior user in
the natural expansion of his trade, and need pass no judgment upon such a case.”).
30. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 26:2, at 26-6; see also Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1027–29 (11th Cir. 1989) (reviewing criteria for
determining the zone of natural expansion). In recent years, some courts have rejected
this concept, see, e.g., Raxton Corp. v. Anania Assocs., Inc., 668 F.2d 622, 623 (1st Cir.
1982) (criticizing the concept of a zone of natural expansion), and the Restatement looks
upon the concept with disfavor, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19
cmt. c (1995).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. c (1995).
32. Refer to note 44 infra. These motivations can be detected in the development of
both nationwide constructive notice through registration and supranational rights. Refer
to text accompanying notes 34–38 infra (discussing the Lanham Act); refer also to Part
III.C.2 infra (discussing the EU’s Community Trade Mark). But the concern for local
traders operating in the climate of economic expansion can be recognized in remedial
rules in both settings. Refer to text accompanying notes 260–62 infra (discussing the

(6)DINWOODIEG5

2004]

10/11/2004 12:02 PM

TRADEMARKS AND TERRITORY

897

endorsed the territoriality rule explained above, the Court’s
opinion contained a caveat reflecting the fact that the Court was
deciding a case under common law principles: the common law
rule defining the scope of rights by reference to use applied
absent contrary legislation.33 In 1918, federal trademark statutes
were much more limited in scope than they are today.34 But with
the development of a national economy, Congress did, in 1946,
enact “valid legislation . . . for the purpose . . . [of] project[ing] the
right of protection in advance of the extension of the trade,”35
namely, the Lanham Act.
In particular, the Lanham Act’s more liberal scheme of
federal registration was enacted partly because commerce was
36
becoming more national in nature. Thus, the Act sought to
facilitate enforcement of rights on a national basis by, inter alia,
deeming registration of a mark on the Principal Register to be
nationwide constructive notice of the registrant’s claim to
ownership.37 As a result, later users in an area remote from the
registrant would neither be able to assert the good faith
necessary to make out a defense, nor claim trademark rights, of
the type available to the Louisville producer in United Drug.38
Federal registration thus secures for the trademark owner
nationwide priority, notwithstanding its use in an area less than
the entire United States.39
The further liberalization of registration procedures by the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,40 which introduced the
possibility of filing an application for federal registration based
expansion of the EU and its effect on CTMs); refer also to text accompanying notes 304–
06 infra (discussing Dawn Donut).
33. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98–99 (1918) (noting
the absence of legislative intervention).
34. Congress perhaps had been chastened by the striking down of the federal
trademark statute in 1879 as an unauthorized exercise of its powers under the Copyright
and Patent Clause of the Constitution, see In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94
(1879), and the breadth of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause was not
then fully appreciated, id. at 96–98.
35. United Drug, 248 U.S. at 98.
36. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277
(“Trade is no longer local, but is national . . . It would seem as if national legislation along
national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce definite
rights should be enacted.”).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2000).
38. See In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Dawn Donut
Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959).
39. To the extent that the junior user has made good faith remote use prior to
federal registration, the registration has the effect of freezing the junior user’s area of
priority. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1181 (1st Cir.
1987).
40. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935.
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on an intent to use the mark in commerce,41 did not radically
change this basic conceptual structure. Under § 7(c) of the
Lanham Act, the filing of an application for registration now
constitutes “constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of
priority, nationwide in effect” (assuming a registration ultimately
issues).42 The practical effect of this provision is to offer
registrants the same benefits as of an earlier date (i.e., the date
of the application).
The importance of the intent-to-use reforms for trademark
applicants in the United States cannot be overstated, but in
terms of the territoriality principle, constructive use operates in
much the same way as does constructive notice. Both provisions
confer nationwide rights without the necessity of actual
nationwide use and thus protect the registrant against remote
junior users; both provisions “grandfather” any remote junior
users that predate the registrant’s priority date; and remedial
rules exist in both contexts to respect local goodwill where the
registrant has not yet started to use the mark locally in ways
43
that give rise to confusion.
Statutory registration schemes thus overlay common law
principles of territoriality. This is not to suggest that registration
44
schemes are not territorial; they are decidedly so. But because
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
42. See id. § 1057(c).
43. See id. (conditioning the benefits of constructive use with respect to earlier
users); refer also to note 32 supra. Dawn Donut, discussed below, clearly limits the ability
of the senior user (and federal registrant) to obtain injunctive relief notwithstanding
nationwide priority if the local area is not one into which there is a likelihood that the
registrant will expand his use. Lanham Act § 7(c) limits the ability of the intent-to-use
applicant to obtain relief pending the commencement of use. See WarnerVision Entm’t
Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1996). The Restatement
suggests that the enactment of the intent-to-use provisions has not altered the rule that
an injunction will not be granted against use in remote areas absent a likelihood of
confusion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. e (1995). Nor indeed
should the position be any more favorable for the holders of registrations based upon an
application under § 44(e). Applications taking advantage of the priority right in § 44(d)
are subject to a further remedial limit. Refer to note 133 infra (discussing § 44(d)).
44. National registration schemes represent efforts to enable and encourage
economic expansion into broader geographic markets without competing trademark rights
becoming a barrier to such commerce. See Peter Jaffey, The New European Trade Marks
Regime, 28 I.I.C. 153, 187–88 (1997) (discussing goals of registration systems). Ironically,
such liberal expansions of rights might in fact undermine the certainty that they seek to
create. To the extent that broader rights clutter the market, conflicts become more likely,
raising transactional costs attendant to, and thus repressing, global trade. Refer to Part
III.A.1 infra (discussing International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003)); see also Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of Trademarks, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/PIL/01/4, paras. 54–57 (Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Private
International Aspects] (discussing the effect of overly broad rights in the Internet context),
http://www.wipo.int/pil-forum/en/documents/pdf/pil_01_4.pdf; refer also to Part III.A.3
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registration systems reflect in greater part the role of trademark
law as an instrument of economic and trade policy, and the
objective of effective enforcement, their territorial character is
due more to the reach of the policymaking or enforcement
authorities than to the intrinsic nature of trademarks.
As a result, registered rights are more likely to conform in
scope to the political authority that issued them, whether the
issuer is a U.S. state or a nation-state.45 As commerce globalizes,
economic policy and judicial enforcement are increasingly
responsibilities of the nation-state, and accordingly the
registration overlay is national. When trademark rights are
conceived of as merely creations of the state, as is the case most
strongly in registration-based systems, the principle of
territoriality will be expressed in terms providing that the
“right . . . is effective only in the country that created the right.”46
Rights defined by the area of use, or by reputation or
renown, are less likely to conform to political boundaries and are
likely instead to be more closely congruent with the breadth of
47
Of course, there are
social or commercial interchange.
exogenous (and dynamic) factors that might cause the area of
use, reputation, or renown to map in some respects to political
units, because patterns of social and commercial activity
correspond to, and are influenced by, political boundaries, and
vice-versa.48 Such limits, however, are not the direct result of
infra (discussing the Joint Recommendation on Internet Use).
45. Refer to Part IV infra.
46. Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International Protection of Trademarks After
the TRIPS Agreement, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 189, 190 (1998).
47. Courts resting rights upon areas of use within the United States have been
reluctant to give conclusive weight to political borders. See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare
Communications, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 733 (8th
Cir. 2001) (breaking down markets in Arkansas county by county); Natural Footwear Ltd.
v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398 n.34 (3d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that
courts should determine the market penetration of a trademark “on the basis of natural
trading areas that may or may not be coextensive with a state’s borders”). In Hanover
Star Milling, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that a trademark “acknowledges no
territorial boundaries of municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every market
where the trader’s goods have become known and identified by his use of the mark.”
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1915). In contrast, Justice
Holmes, in his concurring opinion in Hanover Star Milling, elevated the importance of
political boundaries. See id. at 426 (Holmes, J., concurring) (“I do not believe that a trademark established in Chicago could be used by a competitor in some other part of Illinois
on the ground that it was not known there.”). For an analysis of Holmes’s position, refer to
note 322 infra.
48. Cf. Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L.
REV. 843, 844 (1999) (arguing that “[t]erritorial jurisdiction produces political and social
identities” and that “[j]urisdictions define the identity of the people that occupy them”).
For example, there has been a series of cases brought in U.S. federal courts regarding the
rights of Cuban entities to own trademark rights in the United States, notwithstanding
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political borders imposed without regard to social activity.
As pressures mount to reform trademark law to reflect
further economic evolution toward global, rather than national,
markets, the conceptual structures developed to effect the shift
from local to national markets will be useful models.49 But it will
be important, in gauging the relevance of those models, to bear in
mind the policy objectives that explain the territorial character of
their different parts. Territoriality may reflect—as in the case of
the United Drug rule—efforts to protect goodwill to the extent of
its geographic reach. If our goal is to protect a new breed of
global consumer called into existence by online shopping or
international travel, or to defend global brands brought about by
free trade, extending United Drug beyond the domestic context
might seem attractive. And that rule would lend itself to
extension because its territoriality is rooted in social and
commercial practices, which increasingly transcend national
borders. In contrast, reformers might conclude that global
markets and digital communication have prompted a need for
more effective international enforcement of rights or the
stimulation of cross-border trade. But the mechanisms previously
used to encourage broader enforcement and economic expansion
(e.g., the creation of a more liberal national registration scheme)
the maintenance of the Cuban embargo by the U.S. government. Clearly, the political
boundary between the United States and Cuba has played a substantial role in the
creation of corresponding social patterns. However, Cuban expatriate flight to the United
States, the ready exposure of U.S. consumers to the Cuban market through third
countries, and the rendering of borders ever more porous by the decentralization and
diversification of the information industries may, in recent years, have elevated the social
over the political. At least one judge thinks so, see Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro
Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 1675–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying well-known mark doctrine
to Cuban mark), although the precise basis upon which Judge Sweet recognized rights in
the Cuban company in Empresa Cubana raises substantial questions about the
territoriality doctrine and the ability of domestic companies to adopt marks with the
degree of certainty necessary to make domestic, let alone international, distribution.
Refer to notes 180–82 infra and accompanying text.
49. The extent and fidelity of the replication of these models in current global
initiatives are discussed in Parts III–IV below. I suggest there that some aspects of these
approaches, especially the remedial rules such as those employed in Dawn Donut,
warrant close consideration as we grant broader geographic registrations (such as the
CTM) or have to deal with conflicts created by ubiquitous use online. Refer to Part III.A.3
infra (discussing the Joint Recommendation on Internet Use). However, at least one
federal appellate judge has suggested,
Entering the new millennium, our society is far more mobile than it was four
decades ago. For this reason, and given that recent technological innovations
such as the Internet are increasingly deconstructing geographical barriers for
marketing purposes, it appears . . . that a re-examination of precedents would be
timely to determine whether the Dawn Donut Rule [as to likelihood of entry] has
outlived its usefulness.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Carmax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1057 (6th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J.,
concurring).
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may be less easy to extend geographically. The territorial
character of those mechanisms is rooted not in the intrinsic
territoriality of trademarks, but in the structure of political and
enforcement institutions. Unlike social and commercial actors,
those institutions have not moved substantially beyond the
national model.
B. Territoriality of Laws (Legal Norms)
Trademark laws, the group of legal norms that determine
the availability and scope of trademark rights, are largely
territorial; indeed, they are generally national.50 They are
promulgated primarily by national lawmaking institutions,
whether courts or legislatures. To be sure, there is an increasing
body of international trademark law that, among other things,
imposes certain obligations on signatory countries regarding the
content of their national trademark laws. But that body of
international law has consolidated as much as it has challenged
the territoriality principle.
The Paris Convention, the foundational treaty in this regard,
imposed very few obligations regarding the substantive content
51
of national laws. Instead of universal trademark norms, the
contracting parties chose national treatment—to which
52
territoriality, rather than universality, is the logical corollary —
as the prevailing philosophy of the international trademark
system.53 The national treatment principle—and trademarkspecific elaborations thereon—ensured that nationals of Paris
Union countries were able to seek national rights in foreign
countries on equal terms with domestic applicants.54 The

50. See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The
concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country
solely according to that country’s statutory scheme.”). U.S. states do grant trademark
rights, but these are of limited importance in the twenty-first century.
51. See Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 46, at 199–200 (listing substantive
obligations). The principal obligations that did not relate to questions of registration were
the obligations to protect well-known marks and to grant protection against unfair
competition. Paris Convention, supra note 3, arts. 6bis, 10bis. Both of these obligations are
discussed below.
52. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 543, 547 (1997) (suggesting that the national treatment
principle implies a territorial approach to choice of law in trademark cases); Walter J.
Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 47 VA. L. REV. 733,
734 (1961) (noting the relationship between Paris Convention principles and the concept
of territoriality).
53. See Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (stating the principle).
54. See id. art. 2(1) (articulating this general principle); id. art. 6(2) (specifically
prohibiting a requirement of prior filing in the country of origin).
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Convention did create mechanisms, such as the priority right55
and the telle quelle principle,56 that were intended to facilitate
the acquisition on a multinational basis of the national rights
57
that the Convention sanctified. But the rights in question were
sought and obtained under each country’s respective national
law.
Even if the Paris Convention had contained a far greater
number of provisions aimed at substantive harmonization, other
structural aspects of the system would have limited its
effectiveness in modifying the territoriality of trademark laws.
First, the Convention articulated minimum levels of substantive
protection: states were free to grant higher levels of protection.58
Thus, expanding the number of obligations would not necessarily
have effected substantial harmonization. Second, the treaty
imposed obligations on member states; private parties were left
largely to rely on faithful national implementation of member
state obligations without, pre-TRIPS, much formal compliance
pressure applied to recalcitrant states.59
Although, as discussed below, there has been substantial
development and growth of the international trademark system,
both with respect to substantive harmonization and procedural
55. Id. art. 4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (2000) (implementing Article 4 of the
Paris Convention). Refer to text accompanying notes 60–61 infra (discussing the priority
right).
56.
See Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 6quinquies; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e)
(implementing Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention). Refer to text accompanying notes
60–62 infra.
57. See Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(1) (“The conditions for the filing and
registration of trademarks shall be determined in each country of the Union by its
domestic legislation.”); see also id. art. 6(3) (articulating the principle of independence of
national rights); 15 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (implementing Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention).
Moreover, within eight years the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 175 Consol. T.S. 57 [hereinafter Madrid
Agreement], a special agreement concluded under the Paris Convention, had created a
system further designed to facilitate multinational acquisition of national rights. The
Madrid system, including the Madrid Protocol concluded almost a century later, is
discussed in Part III infra.
58. With respect to the registration provisions, the Paris Convention, atypically for
multilateral international intellectual property instruments, with the exception of treaties
on geographical indications, effectively imposed some ceilings on levels of national
protection by requiring member states to prohibit the registration of certain signs. See
Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 6ter.
59. The self-executing status of the Paris Convention within the United States is
not clear. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298–99 (3d Cir.
1979) (noting that the Paris Convention is not self-executing); cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1956) (suggesting that the Paris Convention is
self-executing, but finding no enlargement of substantive rights under U.S. trademark
law). But see Laboratorios Roldan, C. por A. v. Tex Int’l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1568
(S.D. Fla. 1995) (recognizing a claim under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, relying in
part upon Lanham Act § 44).
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matters, the basic proposition that trademark laws are national
remains largely intact as a theoretical matter.
C. Territoriality of Acquisition Mechanisms: Administrative
Competence
Even if a trademark owner holds broader geographic rights
by virtue of owning a collection of territorial rights, those
trademark rights are typically acquired through national
mechanisms. Territoriality requires a producer to obtain
separate rights for each territory (country) in which it desires
protection, and historically this was achieved by making a
separate application to each national office in which rights were
sought.
International instruments, however, sought to mitigate the
costs and inefficiencies of this premise in different ways.60 The
Paris Convention contained two provisions that facilitated the
acquisition of a collection of national rights. First, the priority
right mandated in national law by Article 4 enables an applicant
to file in one Paris Union country within six months of making an
application for the same mark in another Paris Union country
and to receive in both countries the priority date of the first
application.61 Second, the telle quelle principle, found in Article
quinquies
of the Paris Convention, requires that a trademark
6
registered in its country of origin in compliance with local law is
to be registered in other contracting states “as is” (in French, telle
62
quelle). If broadly construed, the telle quelle principle could
represent a substantial departure from the principle of
territoriality. But that principle is subject to exceptions that
enable participating states to refuse to recognize the foreign right
in certain circumstances, including conflict with prior local rights
or lack of distinctiveness.63 Thus, the intrusion on territoriality is
60. WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 7. Indeed, it may be that, under the
limited reading given Article 6quinquies by the WTO Appellate Body, the United States could
insist on use prior to issuance of the registration based on § 44(e) and still be in
compliance with its obligations under the Paris Convention. That is to say, Crocker
National Bank may overimplement Article 6quinquies, at least as understood by the WPO
Appellate Body in its Report.
61. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 4; 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (2000).
62. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 6quinquies(A)(1).
63. See id. art. 6quinquies(B); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (“A mark duly registered in
the country of origin of the foreign applicant may be registered on the principal register if
eligible . . . .” (emphasis added)). Applicants relying on § 44(e), or indeed on the analogous
provisions of the Madrid Protocol-implementing legislation, must allege a bona fide intent
to use the mark in commerce but are not required to make use in commerce prior to the
registration issuing. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1141f(a) (West Supp. 2004); see also Crocker Nat’l
Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. 909, 914–17, 923 (T.T.A.B.
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minimal. And neither the telle quelle nor the priority principle
derogated from the premise that rights are acquired by separate
(often serial) application to national offices, or from the principle
that rights in different countries exist and are maintained
separately from one another.
In contrast, the Madrid Agreement, concluded eight years
after the Paris Convention, established a system designed to
facilitate multinational acquisition of national rights through a
single application by the owner of a registration in the owner’s
country of origin.64 That application was processed by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), but the application
continued to be separately examined by the different countries of
the Madrid system in which protection was sought.65 Whether
rights were accorded in those other countries remained a matter
of the national law of those countries, and any rights that were
granted were held by the trademark owner as a bundle of
national rights, each existing independently of the other.66
Thus, the Madrid system was a minor modification of the
territorial model under which an international procedure was
used to initiate and facilitate applications for national rights
assessed under national laws by national offices. The primary
benefits were gains in efficiency, effectuated not only by the
centralized application process, but also by permitting
markholders to renew and maintain the bundle of rights through
a single filing—technically, a renewal of the “International
Registration,” though such a registration conferred no
substantive rights in and of itself.
The United States never adhered to the Madrid Agreement,
although, as discussed below, in November 2003 it became a
member of the Madrid system through accession to the Madrid
Protocol.67
D. Territoriality of Jurisdiction and Enforcement: Judicial
Competence
Trademark rights are enforced on a national basis. This
proposition itself involves at least two discrete doctrines. First, a
U.S. trademark confers rights only within the United States;
1984). This sets such applicants apart from intent-to-use applicants who may file based
upon an intent to use, but will not receive a registration until use is demonstrated to the
PTO.
64. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 57, arts. 1(2), 4(1).
65. Id. art. 5(1).
66. Id. art. 4(1).
67. Refer to Part III.C.1 infra.
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extraterritorial enforcement or relief is an exception that the
U.S. courts consider only in a limited number of circumstances.
Second, even where the trademark owner holds rights in several
countries, an action in the U.S. courts is permitted only insofar
as it involves a vindication of U.S. rights. Any action that the
trademark owner wishes to bring based upon the existence of
non-U.S. rights must be brought in the country where those
rights were granted. Clearly, any such action does not arise
under federal law, foreclosing the possibility of federal question
jurisdiction, and even where diversity jurisdiction might be
possible, U.S. courts have declined, for pragmatic reasons, to
assume jurisdiction in such cases.
These dual principles are well illustrated by the decision of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Company.68 The plaintiff in that case
owned the rights to the mark VANITY FAIR for women’s
underwear in the United States and had a federal registration for
that mark. The plaintiff brought suit in federal court in New
York alleging that the defendant, a Canadian corporation with
whom it previously had a distribution arrangement, was
infringing its rights by selling goods under the same mark in
both the United States and Canada.69 The defendant owned a
Canadian trademark registration for the same mark.70
The Second Circuit declined to assert jurisdiction over the
defendant’s Canadian conduct under the Paris Convention
because the national treatment principle consolidates rather
than overturns the principle of territorial enforcement.71
Similarly, the court refused to apply the Lanham Act—i.e., to
enforce plaintiff’s U.S. rights—extraterritorially, because the
case did not fall within the exceptional set of circumstances,
defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co.,72 that warrant departure from the basic principle of
territorial jurisdiction. The court did not think that Congress
intended the Lanham Act to be “applied to acts committed by a
foreign national in his home country under a presumably valid
68. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
69. Id. at 637–38.
70. Id. at 637.
71. See id. at 640 (“The Convention is not premised upon the idea that the trademark and related laws of each member nation shall be given extraterritorial application,
but on exactly the converse principle that each nation’s law shall have only territorial
application.”).
72. 344 U.S. 280, 285–86 (1952) (applying Lanham Act extraterritorially where
defendant, an American citizen, purchased parts in the United States but assembled
them and affixed an infringing mark to goods made from them—which traveled back to
the United States—in Mexico).
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trade-mark registration in that country.”73
Moreover, the court applied the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and declined to exercise diversity jurisdiction over
74
any claims under Canadian law. Although courts are reluctant
to force an American citizen to seek redress in foreign courts, to
the extent that the complaint alleged passing off in Canada, the
Second Circuit stated that that question would be governed by
Canadian law and should be litigated in Canadian courts.75 The
court discerned that the central issue in the Canadian claim
would be the validity of the defendant’s registration and
concluded that U.S. courts should “not determine the validity of
the acts of a foreign sovereign done within its borders,” a
principle that the court extended to the acts of Canadian
Trademark Office officials.76 “To do so would be to welcome
conflicts with the administrative and judicial officers of the
Dominion of Canada.”77 Finally, the court refused to find a basis
for litigation of multinational disputes in the complex provisions
of Lanham Act § 44, which expressly purport to implement and
incorporate U.S. obligations under the Paris Convention.78
This firm insistence on territoriality in the context of
jurisdiction and enforcement thus requires that a plaintiff
alleging trademark infringement by a defendant in a number of
countries sue separately for relief in each of the countries in
which infringing conduct is alleged to have occurred (and in
which the plaintiff has rights). The social or commercial effects of
the conduct in Vanity Fair may have been cross-border, but
judicial enforcement is a profoundly political act. As we will see
below in Part III, because the territoriality of the enforcement
model is rooted in a political institution that remains resolutely
national, the model has been quite resistant to change even as
the volume of cross-border commerce has escalated.

73. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642.
74. Id. at 645–46.
75. See id. at 638–39, 645 (noting federal courts retain power to refuse jurisdiction
in cases that should have been brought in a foreign jurisdiction rather than in the United
States).
76. Id. at 646–47.
77. Id. at 647.
78. See id. at 643–44 (reasoning that because U.S. citizens are given the same
benefits under § 44 of the Lanham Act as foreign nationals, and because foreign nationals
do not enjoy extraterritorial benefits, U.S. citizens are likewise not afforded
extraterritorial benefits).
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E. Territoriality of Goodwill (The Role of Social or Factual
Norms)
In Vanity Fair, the Second Circuit also stressed that “when
trade-mark rights within the United States are being litigated in
an American court, the decisions of foreign courts [or agencies]
concerning the respective trade-mark rights of the parties are
irrelevant and inadmissible.”79 This is, in part, the logical
consequence of the principle of independence of rights enshrined
in the Paris Convention: U.S. rights are entirely separate from,
80
and independent of, foreign rights. Thus, one might regard this
approach as an incident of the rule discussed above: the norms of
trademark law are national and conclusions by national agencies
and courts regarding their application to particular facts are
national too.
But one might also explain the reluctance to make reference
to foreign trademark determinations as reflecting another
consideration, one that is empirically rather than legally
grounded. Descriptively, the meaning of a mark in one territory
is of no necessary relevance to the meaning of the same mark in
81
another territory, even if used by the same producer. As we saw
in the context of United Drug, goodwill has an intrinsic
territorial component; it only reaches so far. Consumer
association with a mark in country A may say very little about
consumer association with the same mark in country B. Refusals
by courts or trademark offices to refer to the trademark status of
the mark in another country could thus rest not only upon the
international legal principle of independence of rights, but also
upon the premise that social norms and practices that give
content to trademark rights are territorial and often national.82
79. Id. at 639; see also Carillon Imp. Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Group, Inc., 913 F. Supp.
1559, 1567–68 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting reference to Russian law determination of
trademark ownership); Double J of Broward Inc. v. Skalony Sportswear GmbH, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1612 (T.T.A.B. 1991) (declaring information concerning foreign
trademark applications and registration not relevant in an opposition proceeding).
80. See Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(3) (declaring that a mark “duly
registered in a country of the union shall be . . . independent of marks registered
in . . . other Countries”); 15 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2000) (explaining registration of a mark
under this provision “shall be independent of the registration in the Country of origin”).
81. Cf. Carillon Imp., 913 F. Supp. at 1568 (rejecting reference to rights in the
Russian market because “‘[o]ur concern must be the “business and goodwill attached to
the United States [marks]”’” (second alteration in original) (quoting E. Remy Martin &
Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imp., Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Roger &
Gallet v. Janmarie, Inc., 245 F.2d 505, 510 (C.C.P.A. 1957)))).
82. Of course, the analysis often proceeds in the opposite direction: to sustain a
legal policy, courts may describe the nature of goodwill in a particular way. See, e.g.,
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (describing the
rejection of the universality theory in gray goods jurisprudence by the U.S. Supreme

(6)DINWOODIEG5

908

10/11/2004 12:02 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[41:3

This Part of the paper has sought to explain the territorial
character of different aspects of trademark law by reference to
the varying policy objectives that dictate a territorial approach.
Some policy objectives implicate the intrinsic purposes of
trademark law and thus are rooted in social and commercial
norms that are fluid and increasingly unconnected to the nationstate. Others reflect complementary trademark values, such as
economic expansion, effective enforcement, or political authority,
and as a result are linked to institutions that remain primarily
national in nature. This last example demonstrates that the line
between what might be called “intrinsic territoriality” and
“political territoriality” is not always clear-cut. But attempting
this analysis does assist in explaining why some territorial
aspects of trademark law might offer more stubborn resistance to
the influence of globalization, a phenomenon that, for some, has
rendered the territorial model anachronistic. And the insights,
even if sometimes contingent, that this analysis provides remind
us that it might be too glib to offer a single prescription to
reconfigure “the principle of trademark territoriality.”
III. THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
TERRITORIALITY
Recent developments in the doctrines discussed in Part II
suggest in some, but far from in all, respects a waning of the
principle of territoriality. This Part of the paper examines some
of the ways in which the force of the territoriality principle has
been attenuated and the ways in which it, perhaps too
stubbornly, persists. To understand fully the extent to which the
principle has been modified, it is important to analyze separately
different aspects of trademark law that are territorially based.
A. Territoriality of Rights: The Requirement of “Use”
With respect to the territoriality of rights, the strength and
effect of the principle of territoriality are determined by the
general rules concerning what amounts to “use” of a mark—both
use sufficient to acquire any rights and use relevant to the

Court in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), and noting that a trademark’s
function is “not necessarily to specify the origin or manufacture of a good (although it may
incidentally do that), but rather to symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic
markholder”). Although the Osawa court described goodwill in a way that explains the
premise underlying the Katzel decision, this is a legal rule presumptively fixing consumer
reaction. There is no suggestion that it is descriptively accurate in terms of actual
consumer reaction to a trademark—it might have been in 1923, and it might not be in
2004.
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geographic scope of those rights—and by exceptions to the use
requirement. The general rule appears nominally unchanged as
of late; use remains a prerequisite to the creation and the scope
of rights.83 Indeed, even as commerce becomes more global, courts
continue to engage in micro-analysis of local markets to
determine the reach of the goodwill embodied by a mark.84
But there have been changes in both what constitutes “use
in commerce” sufficient to acquire and define rights and the
breadth of the exceptions under which rights will be recognized
absent use, particularly under the well-known mark doctrine.
The Lanham Act requires use of a mark “in commerce” in order
to acquire U.S. trademark rights,85 whether to obtain a federal
registration or to assert a claim based upon unregistered rights
under § 43(a).86 Use of a mark in a foreign country creates no
87
rights in the United States.
83. See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency
on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001).
84. See id. (calibrating rights by reference to use on a county by county basis). This
seems consistent with the purposes of trademark, even in a global market. One of the
byproducts of globalization has been to strengthen the demand for some local services,
perhaps in response to the need for distinct identities in the face of feared global
homogenization. As a result of the adherence to this territorial approach under federal
law, state registration cannot be regarded as conferring priority throughout a state, even
though that might be a closer proxy for actual markets and even though as a rule the
consequences of state registration mirror those found at the federal level, because the
geographic scope of rights available under federal law would preempt those conferred by
state law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. e (1995) (noting
the preemption argument); see also Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279,
1284 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining that when conflicts arise between federal and state law
involving state registration statutes, the Lanham Act preempts state law).
85. Professor McCarthy notes that, despite widespread judicial acceptance, there is
no statutory basis for this requirement, which is instead an explicit element essential only
of defendant’s allegedly infringing use. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 29:2, at 29-9
n.9. Of course, the requirement does exist to obtain a registration, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(a)(1) (2000), but Professor McCarthy is correct that no such requirement actually
exists in the language of § 43 (which protects unregistered marks). If courts proceeded
from Professor McCarthy’s observation, it would open up substantial opportunities for
foreign right holders in the United States. To avoid that result, it might not be surprising
that, if pressed, courts implied the limits by way of interpretation of congressional intent,
see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576–77 (1953) (noting that a statute lacking
territorial limit was not written “on a clean slate”), or by way of constitutional authority.
86. The exceptions to this proposition are registrations issued pursuant to Lanham
Act § 44(e) based upon the registration of the same mark by the mark owner in its country
of origin, and registrations flowing from a request for extension of protection under the
Madrid Protocol. Refer to notes 62–63 supra and accompanying text (discussing the telle
quelle principle and the requirements of § 44(e)). At some point, however, § 44 applicants
must use the mark in commerce or the registration may be deemed abandoned. See
Linville v. Rivard, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508, 1512 (T.T.A.B. 1993). The same will be true of
applicants under the Madrid Protocol. Refer to Part III.C.1 infra (discussing the Madrid
Protocol).
87. See 3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 20:26, at 20-165 (Louis Altman ed., 4th ed. Supp. 2004) (“It is well settled
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Resting on the principles espoused in United Drug, which
reserve U.S. rights to those companies whose actual “trade goes
88
attended by the use of [its] mark,” courts have consistently held
that
the mere advertising or promotion of a mark in the United
States is insufficient to constitute “use” of the mark “in
commerce,” within the meaning of the Lanham Act, where
that advertising or promotion is unaccompanied by any
actual rendering in the United States or in “commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,” . . . of the
89
services “in connection with which the mark is employed.”
Moreover, courts took the position that “use of a foreign
trademark in connection with goods and services sold only in a
foreign country by a foreign entity does not constitute ‘use of the
mark’ in United States commerce sufficient to merit protection
under the Lanham Act.”90 It was of no moment that American
consumers had availed themselves of the services or goods sold
by the foreign user, or that Americans had inquired about
possible expansion of the business into the United States.91 Nor
did it matter that the advertising was targeted at American
consumers, or whether the advertising occurred within or
without U.S. borders.92 As far back as 1983, the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board warned that any other rule
would have enormous consequences, in terms of
uncertainty, on our trademark system. Considering the
rapid technological advances in telecommunications,
especially satellite communications, . . . if mere use of a
mark in restaurant services advertising created rights in
the United States, without a filing somewhere on a Register

that foreign use creates no trademark rights in the United States.”). In her dissent in
International Bancorp, Judge Diana Gribbon Motz described this rule as “a corollary of
the well-established principle that trademark rights exist in each country solely as
determined by that country’s law.” Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 384 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J.,
dissenting).
88. See Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918)). Courts have also relied on the
language of the Court in United Drug stressing that trademark rights exist only
“appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.” Buti, 139 F.3d at 103 (quoting United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97); Person’s Co. v.
Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (same).
89. Buti, 139 F.3d at 105 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 and United Drug, 248 U.S. at
97).
90. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 385 (Motz, J., dissenting).
91. Mother’s Rests. Inc. v. Mother’s Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 1046, 1047–
48 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
92. Id.; Buti, 139 F.3d at 103.
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capable of being searched, the adoption of a restaurant
93
mark in the United States would be extremely hazardous.

The rule that only use in the United States could give rise to
U.S. trademark rights was especially significant in priority
contests. It meant that a U.S. producer could adopt a mark in the
United States knowing that the mark had previously been used
94
by another producer abroad. In Person’s Co. v. Christman,
Christman, on a visit to Japan, saw luggage sold under the mark
PERSON’S.95 Upon returning to America and confirming by a
trademark search that the mark was still available in the United
States, Christman adopted the mark and obtained a federal
registration.96 In a contest with the Japanese producer, who
wished to expand into the U.S. market, Christman prevailed
because he was the first user of the mark in the United States.97
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the
argument of the Japanese company that in light of the “world
economy,” priority of rights should be determined by first use
anywhere, even use outside the United States.98 Thus
territoriality, as implemented by national laws and giving rise to
national rights, remained the governing principle, even in a
global economy.
The Federal Circuit did note two circumstances in which the
prior foreign user might prevail notwithstanding that it was not
the first user in the United States: “(1) [when] the foreign mark
is famous here or (2) [when] the use is a nominal one made solely
to block the prior foreign user’s planned expansion into the
United States.”99 Either circumstance might suggest the bad faith
necessary to deprive the U.S. applicant of U.S. rights, but mere
knowledge of a foreign use was not by itself sufficient to sustain
100
that conclusion. In contrast, in the domestic context some
courts have held that mere knowledge of the mark destroyed the
93. Mother’s Rests., 218 U.S.P.Q. at 1051 (Allen, Board Member, concurring). Board
Member Allen also suggested that because “[t]he rendering of the services is in Canada,
by Canadian persons and entities[, t]he profit, if any, emanating from the rendering of
such services accrues to Canadian citizens. . . . Thus, there is no impact as a result of the
spillover advertising on commerce between Canada and the United States.” Id.
94. 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
95. Id. at 1567.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1568–69.
98. Id. at 1569 n.19, 1570.
99. Id. at 1570.
100. The Person’s court echoed one of Board Member Allen’s observations from
Mother’s Restaurants by noting that “Christman’s adoption of the mark occurred at a time
when appellant had not yet entered U.S. commerce; therefore, no prior user was in place
to give Christman notice of appellant’s potential U.S. rights.” Id.
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good faith necessary to sustain junior users’ rights under United
Drug.101
The “famous mark” doctrine, to which the Person’s court
referred, had been acknowledged in several earlier decisions,
although it had rarely been applied to award rights to a foreign
102
user. The doctrine implements U.S. obligations under Article
bis
6 of the Paris Convention, which requires member states,
ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of
an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration,
and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create
confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority
of the country of registration or use to be well known in
that country as being already the mark of a person entitled
to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or
103
similar goods.
As the leading commentator on the Paris Convention has
explained,
bis
The purpose of [Article 6 ] is to avoid the registration
and use of a trademark, liable to create confusion with
another mark already well known in the country of such
registration or use, although the latter well-known mark is
not, or not yet, protected in that country by a registration
which would normally prevent the registration or use of the
104
conflicting mark.
Under one conception, the treatment of well-known marks in
Article 6bis is a derogation from the general principle of
105
territoriality. The international obligation contained in Article
101. See, e.g., Woman’s World Shops Inc. v. Lane Bryant Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1985,
1987–88 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (noting standard). Some courts treat knowledge as one factor
among many. See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir.
2001) (stating that remote junior user’s “knowledge of use is but one factor in a good faith
inquiry”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19 cmt. d (1995)
(suggesting that a junior user does not act in “good faith” if the junior user “intends or
expects that its use will create, either immediately or in the future, a likelihood of
confusion with the goods, services, or business of the prior user”). Neither United Drug
nor Hanover Star Milling offer authoritative guidance. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12,
§ 26:8 (parsing U.S. Supreme Court opinions).
102. See, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
(protecting foreign user of a “famous” mark); see also Mother’s Rests. Inc. v. Mother’s
Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 1046, 1051 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (Allen, Board Member,
concurring) (acknowledging the doctrine as applied in Vaudable).
103. See Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 6bis; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 7, art. 16 (extending the obligation, inter alia, to service marks).
104. G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 90 (1968).
105. One might alternatively regard the doctrine as an elaboration on the type of
effect within a territory that is sufficient to acquire rights in that territory. Refer to text
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6bis was, however, of much greater significance in registrationbased systems. In the United States, the protection of marks
used in the United States but not registered here was largely
accomplished by the availability of protection for unregistered
marks in Lanham Act § 43(a). As a result, the exception, though
routinely recognized in dicta, was rarely the basis upon which
foreign users successfully established rights in the United States.
The level of the United States’ obligations with respect to
well-known marks might have been greater. At the 1958 Revision
Conference of the Paris Union, an attempt to require member
states to protect well-known marks where they had not been
used, as opposed to simply not registered in the country where
106
protection was sought, was narrowly defeated. But the Paris
Convention only imposes minimum obligations, and the United
States is thus free to protect well-known marks without use in
the United States. Under conventional articulations of the
doctrine, this protection, in excess of what is required by the
Paris Convention, is available under U.S. law.107
Both the rule about what constitutes use sufficient to
acquire U.S. rights and the well-known mark doctrine have
recently been the subject of important evolution. In both
instances, that evolution is reflected in domestic case law and
international instruments. The overall trend in each case is, with
108
toward a less vigorous principle of
one minor exception,
territoriality.
1. “Use in Commerce.” The concept of “use in commerce” is
109
But courts have
defined expansively by the Lanham Act.
interpreted that definition consistent with a strict understanding
of territoriality rather than with the broad statutory language.

accompanying note 31 supra. Thus, a revised definition of “use” might declare that
renown may be sufficient penetration of the market to establish goodwill and thus
trademark rights. So conceived, it would be wholly consistent with a principle of
territoriality.
106. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 104, at 91.
107. Indeed, the United States exceeded the international standard in other respects.
Although the most notable application of the doctrine by U.S. courts, in the Vaudable
case, involved services, Article 6bis applied only to goods. Paris Convention, supra note 3,
art. 6bis. It was later extended to service marks by Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Refer to note 103 supra. Slightly higher obligations might also apply in a more limited
regional context. See Thomas D. Drescher, Nature and Scope of Trademark Provisions
Under TRIPS and the Pan-American Convention, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 319 (1997)
(discussing Articles 7–8 of the Pan-American Convention and suggesting that they impose
obligations more extensive than Article 6bis of the Paris Convention).
108. Refer to Part III.A.3 infra (discussing the Joint Recommendation on Internet
Use).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining “use in commerce”).
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Such an approach—as reflected in the rule that advertising (even
in the United States) unconnected to an established U.S. product
or service does not give rise to rights in the United States—has
recently given way in some courts to a broader interpretation of
“use.” This broader definition brings U.S. rights into contest with
rights existing abroad. More frequent conflicts may, however, be
an inevitable consequence of changes in global markets, which
increasingly cause the overlap of previously distinct markets
(whether the markets are defined by reference to geography or by
reference to products).
The prime example of judicial expansion of “use” is the
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco.110 In that case, Société des Bains
de Mer et du Cercle des Étrangérs à Monaco (“SBM”) had, since
1863, owned and operated a casino in Monte Carlo, Monaco
under the mark CASINO DE MONTE CARLO.111 International
Bancorp established a series of online gambling websites with
domain names that incorporated some portion of the term
“Casino de Monte Carlo”; the websites exhibited pictures of the
Casino de Monte Carlo’s exterior and interior and made allusion
to the geographic location of Monte Carlo, “implying that
[International Bancorp] offer[ed] online gambling as an
alternative to their Monaco-based casino, though they operate[d]
no such facility.”112
Unfortunately for the casino operators, the CASINO DE
MONTE CARLO mark, although registered in Monaco, was not
113
registered in the United States. They did, however, promote the
114
casino around the world, including out of a New York office. A
majority of the panel held that the casino operator had U.S.
trademark rights by virtue of its domestic advertising combined
with its rendering of services to American customers,
notwithstanding the fact that it only rendered services under the
mark abroad.115 As the dissenting judge noted, the majority
holding is in considerable tension with existing case law and, she
116
suggested, the principle of territoriality.
110. 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1052 (2004).
111. Id. at 361.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 370.
116. Id. at 385 (Motz, J., dissenting). Refer to notes 88–102 supra and accompanying
text (discussing earlier case law). The majority distinguished those cases on the basis that
while they “support the general contention that ‘use’ must be in the United States, they
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The majority rested its opinion squarely on the definitions of
117
“commerce” and “use in commerce” in the Lanham Act. Taking
into account the statutory instruction that “commerce” under the
Lanham Act was coterminous with Congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause, the majority then read the
definition of “use in commerce” extremely capaciously. Section 45
provides that a service mark shall be deemed to be used in
commerce
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the
services are rendered in more than one State or in the
United States and a foreign country and the person
rendering the services is engaged in commerce in
118
connection with the services.
The majority accepted that mere advertising in the United
States would not satisfy the statutory definition and would
contradict the principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
United Drug, namely, that “[t]here is no such thing as property
in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established
business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.”119 However, because U.S. citizens gamble at the casino
and because the Casino de Monte Carlo is a subject of a foreign
nation, the court concluded that the services were rendered in
“foreign trade” (trade between subjects of the United States and
subjects of a foreign nation) and thus “in commerce” within the
meaning of the Lanham Act.120 And SBM’s promotions used the
mark in the advertising of the services that were so rendered.121
Therefore, under the majority’s reading, U.S. trademark
rights can be acquired through advertising in the United States
combined with the rendering of services abroad to American
customers. The dissenting judge, Judge Motz, would have
insisted that both elements of the statutory definition—
advertising and the rendering of services—occur in the United
States in order to satisfy the use in commerce requirement.122 The
do not support the very different conclusion that both distinct elements of the statutory
‘use in commerce’ definition for servicemarks must occur within the United States.” Int’l
Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 374. It viewed the dissent as likewise conflating the two elements of
the definition. Id. at 380.
117. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 363–64; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining
“commerce” as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
119. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 364 (alteration in original) (quoting United Drug Co.
v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)).
120. See id. at 370.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 383 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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majority rejected such a focus on the place of commerce and
concentrated instead on the characteristics of the parties who
engage in trade.123
Judge Motz’s disagreement stemmed not only from a
different interpretation of the language of the statute and a
concern about adhering to existing judicial interpretations,124 but
also from policy concerns grounded in the principle of
territoriality.125 According to Judge Motz, the territoriality
principle requires that use of a foreign mark in a foreign country
creates no trademark rights under U.S. law.126 The dissent found
support for her conclusion in the language of United Drug and
Hanover Star Milling to the effect that “‘the mark, of itself,
cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the
badge and no trader to offer the article. . . . [T]he trade-mark
right assigned’ cannot be ‘greater in extent than the trade in
which it [is] used.’”127
Moreover, Judge Motz suggested that a contrary approach
would undermine the notice value found in trademark law,
because U.S. producers seeking to clear a mark domestically
would be required to “scour the globe” to determine whether and
when foreign traders using similar marks had sold goods or
128
services to American citizens. This argument recognizes one of
the essential problems of liberalizing the acquisition of
international trademark rights, namely, the cluttering of the
marketplace with attendant increases in transaction costs. This

123. See id. at 366.
124. See id. at 385 (Motz, J., dissenting) (“Until today, every court to address this
issue has held that use of a foreign trademark in connection with goods and services sold
only in a foreign country by a foreign entity does not constitute ‘use of the mark’ in United
States commerce sufficient to merit protection under the Lanham Act.”).
125. Id. at 384 & n.3 (Motz, J., dissenting). The dissent also complained that the
majority’s approach would have an adverse effect on American commercial interests
relative to foreign producers, because the majority’s rule would suddenly confer on foreign
producers, who traded with American travelers, rights in the United States that “[l]ike
some sort of foreign influenza . . . would accompany American travelers on their return
home.” Id. at 389 (Motz, J., dissenting). For the dissent, this was “reverse imperialism,
whereby foreign subjects would be allowed to colonize American markets with their
foreign trademarks based on sales conducted exclusively abroad.” Id. (Motz, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the majority approach would impose substantial costs on domestic
producers, refer to text accompanying notes 134–36 infra, while facilitating the
acquisition of U.S. rights for foreign producers. See Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 389 (Motz,
J., dissenting) (arguing that under the majority rule companies would “suddenly acquire a
windfall of potential United States trademark rights for all of the goods and services
advertised to and purchased by United States citizens while traveling in their countries”).
126. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 385 (Motz, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 391 n.10 (Motz, J., dissenting) (alterations in orginal) (quoting Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416–17 (1916)).
128. Id. at 388–89 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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problem can also be seen acutely in the cyberspace context,
where the effective internationalization of trademark rights that
might occur under a liberal interpretation of the concept of use
online would multiply exponentially the number of conflicts that
would occur, even in registration-based systems.129 Concerns
about the depletion of available marks also motivates the United
States’ retention of the use requirement in the face of foreign
systems that are now largely registration based. And the
existence of such concerns is also partly why the United States
has insisted on a good faith intent to use the mark in the United
States as a prerequisite to using the liberalized mechanisms
found in Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention (implemented in
130
Lanham Act § 44(e)) or the Madrid Protocol. The availability of
marks, without extravagant search costs or uncertainties, is a
dominant domestic U.S. trademark policy.
The radical nature of the majority opinion in International
Bancorp can, however, be overstated.131 In a use-based system
such as the United States, the attenuation of the notice function
has already been brought about in domestic law through the
rejection of the sanctity of the register (not to mention the well132
known mark doctrine
and the priority right contained in
133
§ 44(d)).
Trademarks granted by the U.S. Patent and
129. See Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects, supra note 44, para. 54 (noting
that a broad notion of use online “would convert truly local uses into global uses, giving
rise to innumerable conflicts, causing the depletion of available marks, and eviscerating
the concept of local use through which trademark law has facilitated co-existence of
marks in the past”). Refer to Part III.A.3 infra (discussing the Joint Recommendation on
Internet Use).
130. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1141f(a) (West Supp. 2004) (requiring applicants to declare a
bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce); Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels,
The Changing Landscape of International Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. &
ECON. 433, 438–40 (1994) (noting importance of this requirement to the U.S. trademark
bar).
131. Moreover, it is not clear to what extent this liberalized approach has application
to trademarks, as opposed to service marks. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 374 nn.7–8 (noting
different statutory language).
132. Refer to Part III.A supra (discussing the use requirement).
133. The priority period under § 44(d) means that domestic applications may be
defeated by foreign marks that are unregistered and unknown at the time of the domestic
search, but that are filed within the six month priority period. See SCM Corp. v. Langis
Foods Ltd., 539 F.2d 196, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that under § 44(d), a foreign user
had a “‘right to priority’ for the six months following the filing of its [foreign] application
for registration” and that “intervening use in the United States during that period cannot
invalidate [appellant’s] right to registration in [the United States]”). Thus the demands of
internationalization—namely, efforts dating back a century to facilitate serial acquisition
of national registered rights—already attenuate the notice function and create
uncertainty. Although § 44(d) may cause an unknowing domestic applicant to lose the
priority contest, it does contain some protection to prevent infringement claims against
unsuspecting U.S. users. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d)(4) (2000) (precluding relief for acts
committed prior to the date of the U.S. registration unless the registration is based on use
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Trademark Office (PTO) are always vulnerable to earlier
conflicting unregistered marks, and this vulnerability is hardly
mitigated by the more rigorous examination system in the United
States because the PTO does not ex officio search for conflicts
with unregistered marks.134 Instead, these costs are privatized
through applicants’ own searching and reliance on a vibrant
opposition system.
But detection of domestically used marks, and determination
of when and for what goods such marks were first used, is
substantially easier in the domestic market. Presumably,
producers have some sense of competitors in the same or
adjoining markets, and even with respect to dissimilar product
markets, information is obtained through similar types of sources
and in a similar language as when assessing one’s own domestic
market. This task is much more arduous and costly (by a
multiple greater than just the increased number of countries
searched) when undertaken internationally. Ongoing efforts to
harmonize information contained in applications and
135
registrations, to improve relations between different national
offices, and to make trademark office procedures electronic136 will
help reduce search costs. But search costs after International
Bancorp will still be high; domestic searches do not typically
inquire, for example, into the nationality of the purchasers of the
goods or services. And ironically, though a foreign registration is
likely to exist given the reliance on registration-based systems
abroad, the cautious U.S. applicant will also be obliged to review
foreign uses of unregistered marks. Though such uses might be
insufficient to confer trademark rights in the country where the
goods or services are sold, remarkably, under International
Bancorp, they might be sufficient to confer trademark rights in
in commerce).
134. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1207.03 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter TMEP] (indicating that PTO will not at
the ex parte stage of examination refuse registration on the basis of an unregistered mark
or trade name, jointly referred to as “known marks”), http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/tac/tmep.
135. See Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, 2037 U.N.T.S. 298 [hereinafter
Trademark Law Treaty] (providing for standardized elements in trademark registration
applications and prohibiting a contracting party from demanding more than required in
the Trademark Law Treaty).
136. See Draft Revised Trademark Law Treaty, Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, WIPO Doc. SCT/12/2, at
11 (Feb. 27, 2004) (revising the Trademark Law Treaty to address electronic filing), http://
www.wipo.int/sct/en/documents/session_10/pdf/sct_10_2.pdf. A Diplomatic Conference to
conclude the Revised Trademark Law Treaty is scheduled for March 2006. The United
States has signed several declarations with foreign countries committing itself to jointly
pursuing a compatible electronic filing system for trademarks.
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the United States.
To be sure, the scenario described above portrays the
searching dilemma at its most extreme. The majority rule in
International Bancorp does require advertising or promotion of
the service using the mark within the United States.137 Thus, a
domestic search, though perhaps requiring examination of a
broader array of sources by virtue of the International Bancorp
rule, would likely turn up the mark in question. At the very least,
the requirement of advertising within the United States will
serve as a filter, allowing the domestic applicant to follow up
with international searching only where a potential conflict is
revealed by U.S. promotional activities—such activities might
strongly suggest the presence of U.S. consumers and thus
“foreign trade” within the meaning of the majority rule. And the
globalization of markets has already prompted many domestic
applicants, especially large producers, to conduct international
searches before adopting a mark. However, the additional costs
and difficulties that ensue from this derogation from national
notions of territoriality will likely remain significant, especially
for smaller businesses or those seeking only to market
domestically.
2. The Well-Known Mark Doctrine. With respect to the
scope of trademark rights, the strength of the territoriality
principle has also been eroded both by domestic case law and
international developments that have made the well-known
mark doctrine more readily available as an alternative means for
a foreign user to obtain rights in the United States. Many of the
concerns articulated above with respect to International Bancorp
apply with equal force to some of the developments regarding
well-known marks (especially the Empresa Cubana decision) that
I will discuss in this Part of the paper. This should not be
surprising. The force of the territoriality principle can be equally
affected by a weakening of the doctrine that implements it or by
a strengthening of the exceptions that limit it. Both a liberal
“use” rule and a generous “well-known mark” exception present
the possibility of a foreign user obtaining U.S. rights without a

137. The majority stressed that
it is not enough for a mark owner simply to render services in foreign commerce
for it to be eligible for trademark protection. Nor is it enough for a mark owner
simply to use or display a mark in the sale or advertising of services to United
States consumers. Both elements are required, and both elements must be
distinctly analyzed.
Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329
F.3d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1052 (2004).
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business located in the United States. Indeed, both the majority
and the dissent in International Bancorp reflect awareness of the
connection between these doctrines. The majority downplayed
fears of havoc in trademark law resulting from its grant of rights
based upon use of a mark in connection with a foreign business
by noting that, conceptually, this was precisely what the wellknown mark doctrine did.138 And the dissent hinted
parenthetically that that doctrine was the closest alternative
argument available to the casino operators.139
Indeed, the dissent’s rebuttal of the majority’s comments
regarding the connection between the well-known mark doctrine
and the “use” rule the court announced provides a good starting
point for consideration of the recent liberalization of the wellknown mark doctrine. The dissent was not comforted by the
majority’s analogy to the well-known mark doctrine because it
“has been applied so seldom (never by a federal appellate court
and only by a handful of district courts) that its viability is
uncertain.”140 Indeed, Judge Motz noted that the casino operator
“conceded . . . that it could not prevail on a famous marks
argument without showing ‘some use’ of its mark in the United
141
States.”
Judge Motz is surely correct that, although recognized in
many cases, the well-known mark doctrine has rarely been
applied by U.S. courts to sustain rights for a foreign user. The
latter point, the concession by the casino operators that some use
in the United States is required to secure protection under the
well-known mark doctrine, which the dissent seemed willing to
142
bis
accept, is not as clear. As noted above, Article 6 of the Paris
Convention does not require the United States to offer protection
to marks without use; it simply requires such marks to be
protected without registration in the United States.143 A strict
minimalist implementation of this obligation would add little to
domestic U.S. law, given the scope of Lanham Act § 43(a), and
138. See id. at 372, 381–82 (noting that the well-known mark doctrine recognizes the
undesirability of domestic confusion resulting from use of foreign trademarks).
139. See id. at 389 n.9 (Motz, J., dissenting); cf. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 29:2,
at 29-9 to 29-10 (agreeing with result but suggesting that the case should have been
resolved under the famous mark doctrine).
140. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 389 n.9 (Motz, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
142. In both recent district court cases discussed below, in which the doctrine was
found to be satisfied, the plaintiff had not used the mark in the United States at the time
that it sought to take advantage of the well-known mark doctrine. Grupo Gigante S.A. de
C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 1675 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
143. Refer to text accompanying notes 102–08 supra.
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thus it might explain the paucity of cases in which a plaintiff has
successfully relied on the doctrine in U.S. courts.144 However,
leading U.S. commentators do not regard use in the United
States as a prerequisite for the well-known mark doctrine in U.S.
law, largely because of the consequent disutility of the doctrine.145
In any event, neither interpretation of the well-known mark
doctrine has, in practice, represented a substantial intrusion on
144. If International Bancorp is good law, then perhaps there would be even less
need to rely on the well-known mark doctrine. One could obtain rights based upon the
provision of services abroad to Americans provided that one has advertised in the United
States (and developed secondary meaning if the mark is not inherently distinctive). This
would seem an easier task than pursuing the possibility that the mark was well known in
the United States, a status rarely satisfied, and in conventional understanding connoting
something more than distinctive. Of course, as we will see below, the Grupo Gigante and
Empresa Cubana courts appear to be competing with the Fourth Circuit in efforts to
create rights without use in the United States. Their low standard for well-known mark
status, secondary meaning, may in some respects be more generous than the
International Bancorp route. See Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (stating that
“[i]n determining whether the plaintiffs’ mark was sufficiently known to warrant
protection, the Court will consider the same factors that are considered in determining
whether a descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning”); Empresa Cubana, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1676–77 (requiring only secondary meaning for a mark to be deemed
famous within the meaning of Vaudable). To take advantage of the well-known mark
doctrine as articulated by these courts, one would not be obliged to have served
Americans or advertised in the United States (though one might think that both these
factors would be important to proof of secondary meaning, were it not for the lax standard
applied by the two courts following this lenient approach). In any event, both avenues
(“use” under International Bancorp or a liberal definition of well-known marks) now seem
easier than § 44(e), the expressly sanctioned route for foreign producers to obtain rights,
which requires: (1) an identity between the claimed mark and the foreign registration in
the country of origin, (2) a bona fide intent to use in commerce (although complying with
this requirement surely is rendered easier by International Bancorp, as one need only
intend to serve Americans and advertise in the United States), and (3) a distinctive mark.
15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2000); refer to note 172 infra and accompanying text (discussing the
requirement that a foreign mark be distinctive).
145. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 29:61, at 29-164, 29-166 (suggesting that use
is not required to obtain the benefit of the doctrine). The biggest uncertainty generated by
the broader interpretation arises in the registration context where § 2(d), the most likely
candidate upon which the owner of a well-known mark could base an opposition,
expressly requires the use of the mark in the United States.
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account
of its nature unless it—
....
(d) . . . [has been] previously used in the United States by another and not
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the
applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000). Despite the statutory lacuna, it is clear that the well-known
mark doctrine is applied in the registration context without the need for use. The
protection of well-known marks in the registration context might seem easier if the Paris
Convention were self-executing, see British-Am. Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 55
U.S.P.Q.2d 1585, 1589 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (relying on self-execution of the Pan-American
Convention in the context of cancellation), but this would not help in any event because
the Paris Convention does not mandate protection without use.
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the principle of territoriality in the United States.
Recent developments, however, if broadly accepted, suggest
that the well-known mark doctrine is likely to be a more
significant exception to territoriality in the future. Although
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention does not require that member
states provide protection to well-known marks without regard to
use, member states are free to exceed the minimum standards in
the Convention, and indeed, the approach of requiring protection
without use commands increasing support as an internationally
mandated standard.146 As a result, in 1999, the WIPO General
Assemblies and the Paris Union agreed to a nonbinding
recommendation
on
well-known
marks
(the
“Joint
Recommendation on Well-Known Marks”), which stipulates that
a well-known mark will be protected in a specific country on the
ground that it is well known, even if the mark is not registered or
used in that country.147 Indeed, a member state is prohibited not
only from requiring that a mark be used in that state as a
condition for determining whether a mark is well known, but also
from requiring that the mark be registered in any other member
state.148
The expansion of the well-known mark doctrine that the
Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks purports to
effect—which would preclude the United States from imposing
the use requirement hinted at by the dissent in International
Bancorp149—is, however, contained in a nonbinding resolution.
Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement, which clearly does bind the
United States, also effected a limited expansion of international
obligations with respect to well-known marks. Article 16(2)
bis
extended the protection of Article 6 of the Paris Convention to
service marks and provided some guidance, which is lacking in
the Paris Convention, regarding the meaning of “well-known
146. See Report of the First Session of the Committee of Experts on Well-Known
Marks in Geneva on November 13–16, 1995, WIPO Doc. WKM/CE/I/3, paras. 75–80 (Nov.
16, 1995) (stating that a majority of countries believe that protection of well-known marks
should be available regardless of whether a mark is used in the territory in which
protection is sought).
147. See Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of WellKnown Marks, adopted by Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial
Property and General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO
Doc. 833(E), art. 2(3)(i) (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter Joint Recommendation on Well-Known
Marks] (prohibiting member states from requiring that a mark be used in a member state
as a condition for protection as “well known”).
148. Id. art. 2(3)(ii).
149. Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a
Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 383 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting) (suggesting that use in
the United States might be a requirement to receive protection as a well-known mark
under U.S. law).
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mark.” 150 Article 16(3) enlarged the scope of Article 6bis to protect
against use of the mark on dissimilar goods.151 These expansions
do not, however, require the enhancement of existing protection
under U.S. law. The most notable case in the United States
proffered as an example of the application of the doctrine
involves a service mark,152 the additional guidance in TRIPS
concerning the meaning of the term “well-known mark” is quite
general,153 and U.S. law already provides sufficient protection
against uses of a mark on dissimilar goods.154
Thus, although international norms regarding well-known
marks have been strengthened, it might appear that U.S. law
remained largely unaffected. U.S. law was already consistent
with binding TRIPS obligations. And although requiring
protection without use, as the Joint Recommendation on WellKnown Marks does, would consolidate in place the more generous
interpretation of the well-known mark doctrine in U.S. law and
preclude any limitation of the doctrine in the way suggested by
Judge Motz, it is contained in a nonbinding instrument.
However, the fortification of the well-known mark exception
to territoriality, as an international obligation of the United
States, has in fact happened. Although the Joint
Recommendation on Well-Known Marks is not binding, the

150. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 16(2).
151. Id. art. 16(3).
152. See Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
153. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 16(2) (“In determining whether a
trademark is well-known, account shall be taken of the knowledge of the trademark in the
relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in that Member obtained as a result of
the promotion of the trademark.”).
154. Congress, in enacting federal dilution protection in 1995, claimed that Article
16(3) also required the enactment of dilution protection, which Congress then offered to
“famous marks” within the meaning of the federal dilution legislation rather than “wellknown marks” within the meaning of the Paris Convention or TRIPS. H.R. REP. NO. 104374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (noting that dilution
protection for famous marks is required for consistency with TRIPS). However, strong
arguments exist that the legislative history of the dilution law overstates the obligations
of Article 16(3) and that confusion-based causes of action under U.S. law satisfy Article
16(3). See Paul J. Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the
Contours of the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 654 (1996) (“The
‘connection’ requirement is better understood to establish a cause of action for false
sponsorship or association, remedies for which are already found in the Lanham Act.”);
Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation
and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 84 n.40 (1996)
(suggesting that “[i]t is not at all clear that [Article 16(3)] requires enactment of a federal
dilution statute”). But cf. Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is
Harmony Possible in the Global Village?, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 130 (1996) (advancing
the possibility that Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement may require “an action of
trademark dilution in the absence of any confusion but where some association of the
well-known mark with the goods or services of the registered owner is present”).
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United States is including compliance with the Joint
Recommendation as a term of bilateral agreements being
concluded with various nations and is thus assuming
international obligations on this issue.155 To be sure, these
agreements are not directly effective in U.S. law, and the United
States may domestically fail to comply with its international
obligations. However, this is a step not lightly taken, and in the
last year, courts have made reference to the Joint
Recommendation on Well-Known Marks to obtain guidance on
the meaning of the term in U.S. law.156
Moreover, the Joint Recommendation on Well-Known
Marks, again with the same argument for efficacy as above, also
outlines—in far greater detail than the Paris Convention or
TRIPS—the considerations that shall be relevant to the
157
These
determination of whether a mark is well known.
provisions are not exhaustive and thus—although part of a
concerted effort in international instruments over the past ten
years to give more meaning to the concept first articulated in
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention—do not represent any specific
incursion into the territoriality principle. The overall effect of
this activity, however, is surely to consolidate the well-known
mark exception to territoriality, albeit not in a particular,
concrete way. Finally, the Joint Recommendation on Well-Known
Marks specifically requires that well-known marks receive
protection against dilution158—thereby removing any ambiguity
regarding the extent of the obligation to protect against use on
dissimilar goods found in Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement—
and it requires such protection in circumstances that might not
currently be afforded by Lanham Act § 43(c).159
155. See Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.2(b)(1) (providing
that each party shall give effect to the Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks),
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Section_Index.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2004); cf. Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.2(9)
(recognizing the importance of the Joint Recommendation and undertaking to be guided
by its principles), http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Section_
Index.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
156. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 1578–79
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
157. See Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks, supra note 147, art. 2(1)
(mandating consideration of, inter alia, public recognition, use, and promotion of the
mark).
158. Id. art. 4(1)(b)(ii).
159. The Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks mandates protection against
marks that are “likely to impair or dilute in an unfair manner the distinctive character of
the well-known mark.” Id. (emphasis added). This standard is almost identical to the one
recently rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418, 432–33 (2003) (holding that protection under federal law requires a showing of
actual dilution). Moreover, the standard is augmented by requiring protection against
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International obligations to protect well-known marks have
thus been enhanced of late. And, although the most clearly
binding international obligations do not require strengthening of
the well-known mark doctrine in U.S. law, the soft law provisions
of the Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks might both
further the international trend and create pressure on the United
States to ensure vigorous protection for well-known marks under
domestic law.
Parallel expansion of the well-known mark doctrine through
liberalization of the definition of “well-known mark” can be seen
in recent case law in the U.S. courts. In two recent cases, district
courts have suggested that a mark must attain only a low
threshold to avail itself of the benefit of the doctrine. In both
160
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. and Empresa
161
Cubana del Tabaco v. Culboro Corp., the courts held that a
mark that had not been used in the United States could be “wellknown” for the purposes of this doctrine provided that secondary
162
meaning could be shown in the United States.
In both cases, a foreign plaintiff that had not used the mark
in the United States brought an infringement action against a
U.S. company using the mark in the United States, and in both
cases, the plaintiff successfully relied upon the well-known mark
163
doctrine. In Grupo Gigante, the plaintiff used the mark on
grocery stores in Mexico, and the defendant used the mark for its
stores in San Diego.164 In Empresa Cubana, a Cuban company
used the mark on premium cigars sold in Cuba and elsewhere—
but not in the United States because of the Cuban embargo—and
brought its action against an American manufacturer selling
165
cigars under the same name in the United States.
The relevant international instruments—the Paris
“the use of that mark [that] would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character of
the well-known mark,” Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks, supra note 147,
art. 4(1)(b)(iii), language that resembles the arguably broader dilution concept under EU
law. See First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the
Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, art. 5(2), 1990 O.J. (L 40) 1
(granting protection where the junior mark “without due cause takes unfair advantage of,
or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trademark”).
160. 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
161. 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In the interest of full disclosure, I should
acknowledge that periodically I have acted as a consultant with respect to certain
questions in the Empresa Cubana litigation.
162. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1090; Empresa Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1682.
163. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1089–90, 1098; Empresa Cubana, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1654, 1682.
164. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
165. Empresa Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1653–54.
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Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and even the Joint
Recommendation on Well-Known Marks—do not offer a clear
conceptual understanding of what is a well-known mark, and the
issue becomes even murkier when domestic U.S. law is
superimposed. Some of the uncertainty (and incoherence) stems
from a terminological difficulty. The well-known mark doctrine is
sometimes referred to in U.S. case law as the “famous mark”
doctrine.166 Yet that term is also the term used by Congress in
1995 to define the subset of marks that obtain protection against
167
dilution.
Moreover, although the Lanham Act contains a detailed list
of what considerations are relevant to the question of fame, it
does not contain any definition of the standard that must be met
168
before a mark is famous for the purposes of dilution protection.
The exceptional protection against dilution afforded to famous
marks is clearly limited to only a few marks, which Professor
McCarthy has called “superstar” marks. The statutory standard
is therefore very high. Because the term “famous” is often used in
U.S. case law implementing Article 6bis, the defendants in both
Grupo Gigante and Empresa Cubana argued that the standard
for protection under the “well-known mark” doctrine was the
same (high) standard as that found in the federal dilution law.169
In both cases, the court found that the plaintiff’s mark was not
170
famous within the meaning of the federal dilution legislation.
Congress has done nothing that would discredit the
connection, and indeed has contributed to the argument of
approximation. When the federal dilution legislation was
enacted, Congress saw in Article 16(3) of TRIPS an obligation to

166. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). There is, in fact, a glut of similar terminological
inconsistencies throughout many foreign laws. See Mostert, supra note 154, at 114–19
(discussing the variety of terms and definitions used to refer to well-known marks,
including “notorious,” “famous,” “highly-renowned,” “highly-reputed,” and “exceptionally
well-known”).
168. This is a criticism leveled at U.S. dilution law in the context of applying the
statute domestically. See Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 659, 663–64, 693 (1998) (noting that
the Lanham Act’s factor-based definition of “fame” does not offer much guidance).
169. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1089–90 (analyzing the potential
applicability of the FTDA’s requirement that a famous mark have a “high degree of
renown” to an inquiry under the well-known mark doctrine, but concluding that
secondary meaning is the relevant standard for protection as a well-known mark);
Empresa Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1677 (noting defendant’s assertion that “‘[t]he FTDA
standard for fame is consistent with cases analyzing fame under the well-known marks
doctrine’”).
170. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1102; Empresa Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1692.
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offer “well known marks” protection against dilution—protection
that it then conferred on a subset of marks defined by the term
“famous.”171 Likewise, although the original terms of Article 6bis,
which protected well-known marks against confusion, might not
suggest a necessary connection between dilution and “wellknown marks,” the ambiguous language of Article 16(3) and the
quite unambiguous language of the Joint Recommendation on
Well-Known Marks appear to afford the category of “well-known”
marks exceptional (dilution) protection similar to that afforded to
another subset of marks (“famous” marks) under U.S. law.
Yet both courts rejected a high standard (and in particular
the statutory standard of fame relevant to dilution protection) for
well-known marks, partly because of what the courts saw as the
172
and partly
more exceptional nature of dilution protection,
because the courts claimed to see affirmative connections
between the concept of well-known marks and the domestic
secondary meaning standard.173
The affirmative reasons proffered by the two courts for the
standard that a mark is well known in the United States if
secondary meaning is shown here are unconvincing and raise a
series of policy concerns that track those generated by the
International Bancorp opinion. Both courts found support for the
argument that the standard is low in what they described as a
survey of case law (even though the well-known mark claim has
171. Refer to note 154 supra.
172. It is too simplistic to suggest, as the Empresa Cubana court does, that the
standard for well-known marks will not be the same as famous marks because “the
protection available under the FTDA is much greater.” 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1678. Dilution
protection is indeed greater than that afforded by classic infringement theories, but the
well-known mark doctrine also affords much greater protection because, unlike a classical
infringement case, it does not require use in the United States. Might there thus be a
conceptual connection that would support such an approximation of “famous” and “wellknown”? Article 6bis, in its original incarnation, might be seen as a broadening of the
geographic scope of protection (at least insofar as it addressed registration-based
systems), while dilution protection is essentially a broadening of protection with respect
to classical product-based limits. Both doctrines appear to recognize exceptional
protection, beyond the classical scope of trademark rights, for an extremely small subset
of marks. The two subsets may not correspond precisely—that is, the test of marks to be
protected as “well-known” may be different from the test of fame used to determine which
marks are protected against dilution—because the scope of the derogation (i.e., when
infringement will be found in these special cases) and the purpose underlying the
derogation is different. But it is surely not the case that the test for whether a mark is
exceptionally protected as a well-known mark can be the same as the test for whether a
mark receives protection under the Lanham Act as a routine matter. Yet that is
essentially the test that both the Grupo Gigante and Empresa Cubana courts developed in
permitting a mark to receive protection as a well-known mark on the basis of secondary
meaning.
173. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1091; Empresa Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1677–78.
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rarely succeeded).174 The lax secondary meaning standard cannot
be extrapolated from the cases where the well-known mark
doctrine was applied. Both the Grupo Gigante and Empresa
Cubana courts single out, in particular, the Vaudable case as an
illustration of a court protecting a well-known mark based upon
secondary meaning.175 The Vaudable case cannot, however, be
read for the proposition that secondary meaning is all that is
required to support Article 6bis-derived protection for well-known
marks. Vaudable contains language regarding the international
fame and prestige of the mark at issue in that case, and that
level of consumer awareness of the mark was well in excess of
bare secondary meaning.176
In Grupo Gigante, the argument for a secondary meaning
standard was buttressed by the proximity in Professor
McCarthy’s treatise of a reference to the Tea Rose-Rectanus
(United Drug) doctrine, thus suggesting that all that is required
is that the mark is known (as opposed to “well-known”) in the
United States.177 The court cited the treatise despite Professor
McCarthy’s acknowledgment that the Tea Rose-Rectanus
doctrine does not apply in the international context.178 The
considerations that might permit an expansion of the geographic
scope of rights within the United States have not been applied in
the international context, recognizing that the common law
principle of territoriality has been overlaid by national political
boundaries. The Lanham Act represents a compromise between
different conceptions of territoriality. It balances the
territoriality intrinsic to the purpose of trademark law (which
informs the scope of common law rights) with the politically
grounded values of territoriality that exalt national borders (by
granting nationwide rights in advance of trade through federal
registration). The Empresa Cubana and Grupo Gigante courts
have ignored the second dimension to territoriality and have
effectively erased the nationality component of the use
requirement from U.S. law. Domestic marks routinely claim
174. See Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1090–91 (citing various cases); Empresa
Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1677–78 (identifying Vaudable).
175. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1090–91; Empresa Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1676–78.
176. Moreover, the French restaurant owned a registration in the United States for
catering services. Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (Sup. Ct. 1959). At
the time, the related goods (or related services) doctrine was not as vibrant as under
current law. Today, the restaurant would probably not even need to make the famous
mark argument, so Vaudable can hardly be read as establishing a standard that captures
the exceptional nature of the doctrine.
177. Grupo Gigante, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
178. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 26:5 n.1, at 26-12.
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protection based upon distinctiveness and use in the United
States. Under these new cases, the test for protection of foreign
marks in the United States is simply actual distinctiveness in the
United States, assessed under the same test that is used in the
typical domestic case to determine whether a mark gets any (let
alone exceptional) protection.179
In Empresa Cubana, the court also supported the secondary
meaning standard by noting the similarity between the factors
used to prove secondary meaning and those found in the Joint
Recommendation on Well-Known Marks indicating that a mark
is well known.180 The similarity of factors used to determine
secondary meaning and the factors found in international
instruments addressing well-known marks does not support the
assimilation of the standards for determining whether a mark
falls into those two categories. The Empresa Cubana court
conflated the standard for determining whether a mark meets
the level of distinctiveness that warrants protection as a wellknown mark with the evidentiary factors that assist in
determining whether that standard is met.181 Less tendentiously,
the same evidence is used at many different points in trademark
analysis, but such multiple utility does not require the
approximation of all the legal rules to which the evidence is
relevant.182
Shortcomings in the Grupo Gigante and Empresa Cubana
opinions go beyond the use of an overly liberal standard for

179. Refer to note 172 supra. An alternative conceptualization of what these courts
have done is that, rather than erasing the use requirement from U.S. law, they have
rewritten it. Use is now satisfied by general renown or reputation rather than by
requiring that there be “trade [in the country] in which it [is] used.” Int’l Bancorp, LLC v.
Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 391 n.10
(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416–17
(1916)). Such a conceptualization might peripherally reflect Professor McCarthy’s
analysis of the well-known mark exception, which Judge Sweet cites in Empresa Cubana.
But it is doubtful that Professor McCarthy intended for his attempt to explain the wellknown mark doctrine within the rubric of U.S. trademark law to be used to support an
equation of well-known mark with “mark”. Territoriality is indeed a cardinal principle of
international trademark law, but use is a cardinal principle of U.S. trademark law. It is
the principle upon which U.S. negotiators most steadfastly insist in international
negotiations, and these courts have radically abolished it.
180. Empresa Cubana, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1678–79.
181. Only occasionally does Judge Sweet acknowledge this distinction. See, e.g., id. at
1679 (noting that the WIPO factors do not dictate the level of fame).
182. Indeed, if a mere correlation of “factors” is to be used to identify the nature of
the well-known mark exception, the factors in the Joint Recommendation on Well-Known
Marks—which Judge Sweet endorses as indicative of U.S. law—mesh just as well with
those in § 43(c)(1)’s definition of “fame” for dilution purposes as they do with the
secondary meaning factors. One cannot look simply at the factors; one has to look at the
extent of recognition—that is, the metric and not the factors.
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protection as a well-known mark. Even assuming the standard is
correct, both courts (as well as, once more, International
Bancorp) do not appear to grasp the full consequences of
attempting to discern consumer association without domestic
use. In all three cases, International Bancorp, Grupo Gigante,
and Empresa Cubana, the court accorded rights to foreign
producers who had not used their marks in the United States. In
both well-known mark cases, Grupo Gigante and Empresa
Cubana, the courts noted that the secondary meaning standard
explicitly requires the plaintiff to show acquired distinctiveness
in the United States notwithstanding lack of use. Likewise, the
majority in International Bancorp noted that an unregistered
mark used in foreign trade will merit Lanham Act protection
only when it is distinctive among U.S. consumers. Use without
distinctiveness is insufficient because such use does not generate
goodwill among American consumers.
Under the International Bancorp rule, secondary meaning
will not always be required for unregistered foreign marks to
merit Lanham Act protection; inherently distinctive marks used
to offer services to Americans abroad, with accompanying
advertising under the mark in the United States, will be
protected without proof of secondary meaning. But in
International Bancorp itself, this principle should have presented
a challenge to the casino operator because the mark was
geographically descriptive and hence unprotectable absent
secondary meaning.183 Thus, all three cases raise a relatively new
issue: do consumers truly develop understandings regarding the
sources of a product when there has been no use in the United
States, and how does one prove that secondary meaning?
Assessment of applications filed based upon Lanham Act § 44(e)
suggest that proving secondary meaning absent use in the
United States should be quite arduous.184
183. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 370.
184. The relevant section of the TMEP highlights this difficulty:
A § 44 applicant may assert that a mark has acquired distinctiveness under 15
U.S.C. §1052(f) if the applicant establishes that the mark has become distinctive
of its goods or services in commerce in the same manner that any other applicant
must. For these purposes, the applicant may not rely on use other than use in
commerce that may be regulated by the United States Congress, that is, the
applicant may not rely on use solely in a foreign country.
TMEP, supra note 134, § 1010; see also id. § 1212.08 (“The applicant may not rely on use
other than use in commerce that may be regulated by the United States Congress in
establishing acquired distinctiveness. Use solely in a foreign country is not evidence of
acquired distinctiveness in the United States.”). Of course, § 44 applicants should
arguably have the right to contend before the PTO that “use in commerce” has a meaning
consistent with International Bancorp, but precedent in the TTAB (Mother’s Restaurants)
and Federal Circuit (Person’s) suggest otherwise, making § 44’s mechanism a less

(6)DINWOODIEG5

2004]

10/11/2004 12:02 PM

TRADEMARKS AND TERRITORY

931

In this regard, the secondary meaning analysis in
International Bancorp appears suspect. The majority concluded
that the mark possessed secondary meaning and could thus be
185
protected. The court relied on the typical factors relevant to a
secondary meaning inquiry, including substantial advertising
and sales success in the United States, and noted that under
186
Fourth Circuit case law, Larsen v. Terk Technologies, SBM
could meet its burden of proving secondary meaning because it
had established that the online companies intentionally copied
187
the mark. Under Larsen, a trademark plaintiff who proves that
the defendant directly and intentionally copied its mark is
presumed to have proved that mark’s secondary meaning, and
188
the defendant must then rebut that presumption. Yet it is well
established that the copying of a mark used abroad does not by
itself amount to bad faith.189
The unquestioning invocation of presumptions often used in
domestic distinctiveness analysis results in an overly liberal
doctrinal stance toward the creation of U.S. rights without use or
registration in the United States, and it is replicated in the
Empresa Cubana opinion.190 The court there relies almost
exclusively on the third secondary meaning factor, intentional
copying.191 But the court’s finding of secondary meaning cannot
rest on intentional copying alone, because, as the court notes
192
elsewhere in the opinion, the copying was not done in bad faith.
Only copying done with a bad faith intent to pass off, not simply
to compete, contributes to a finding of secondary meaning.193
Thus, were the Empresa Cubana court to rest on that intentional

attractive proposition for the foreign right owner. Section 44(e) applicants will, however,
retain the advantage of certainty over those foreign mark owners relying on judicial
determinations of well-known mark status.
185. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 372.
186. 151 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 1998).
187. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 371 (citing Larsen, 151 F.3d at 148–49).
188. See Larsen, 151 F.3d at 148 (citing Osem Food Indus. v. Sherwood Foods, 917
F.2d 161, 163 (4th Cir. 1990)).
189. See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569 n.18, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Bulk Mfg. Co. v. Schoenbach Prods. Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. 664, 667–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
190. Indeed, that two or three of the six factors typically relevant to secondary
meaning (sales success, length and exclusivity of use, and possibly advertising
expenditures) are unlikely to be applicable to the well-known mark context should
indicate that secondary meaning is not the appropriate level on which to grant protection.
191. The court’s conclusion on survey evidence is ambivalent or weak, and the court’s
conclusion on unsolicited media coverage is also troubling given that the advertising
involved was heavily solicited. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70
U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 1680–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
192. See id. at 1688, 1693 (concluding that General Cigar did not act in bad faith).
193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995).
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copying factor alone, it would have converted trademark law
from a law against misrepresentation into a law against
misappropriation, which courts have continually stressed is not
the role of the Lanham Act. Thus, putting aside for present
purposes the dubious reliance on secondary meaning as the legal
standard for well-known marks, both cases, International
Bancorp and Empresa Cubana, involve an inappropriate
application of the secondary meaning test that further erodes the
principle of territoriality.
The liberal approach to the acquisition of rights in the
United States demonstrated by all three courts (International
Bancorp, Grupo Gigante, and Empresa Cubana) discussed in this
Part of the paper sustains one aspect of territoriality alone,
namely, that which reflects the intrinsic purpose of trademark
law. These courts elevate concerns about domestic consumer
confusion without consideration of other values underlying
territoriality. As demonstrated above, trademark law may adopt
a territorial (or national) stance in order to pursue other
objectives. By ignoring an increase in uncertainty and search
costs, and by undermining the established international systems
for registration of rights on a multinational basis, these courts
have undervalued the importance of territoriality rooted in
national political and economic structures.
3. Use on the Internet: The WIPO Standing Committee on
Trademarks. As is implicit in the discussion above, the concept of
use is central to the attitude U.S. law adopts toward the global
market. But the concept of use is important even in registrationbased systems where use is still required to maintain a
registration and to determine infringement. In both systems, use
has been interpreted with an implicit territorial dimension; use
in Germany does not, as a general matter, infringe on rights
owned in France. As seen above, this concept of use has been
rendered unstable by the growing cross-border activity of
producers and consumers. Nowhere is this more acute than in
the context of the Internet, which typifies (and celebrates) such
activity.
In recent years, the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law
of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications
(“SCT”) developed provisions on the concept of use on the
Internet, which were adopted as a nonbinding instrument by the
WIPO General Assemblies and the Paris Union in 2001.194 The
194. See Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks,
and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet, adopted by Assembly of
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Joint Recommendation on Internet Use consists of two
components. The first component reduces the number of likely
conflicts, and thus problems of clutter, in the online environment;
the second component suggests a flexible approach to mediating
conflicts that do occur notwithstanding the first part of the Joint
Recommendation.
Under the first component, use of a sign on the Internet
should only be treated as use—whether to acquire rights or to
determine infringement—in any particular state if the use of the
sign has a “commercial effect” in that state.195 The Joint
Recommendation further details the nonexhaustive factors
relevant to a determination of whether a sign has a commercial
effect in a state.196 The second component of the Joint
Recommendation limits the liability of an owner of trademark
rights in one country that uses its mark online in a way that has
a commercial effect in another state.197 In particular, such a mark
owner should not be liable to the mark owner in that foreign
state prior to receiving a “notification of infringement,” provided
that the mark owner’s rights were not acquired in bad faith and
that contact details are provided on the website where the sign is
displayed. Even upon receiving a notification, the user can avoid
liability by expeditiously taking reasonable steps “to avoid a
commercial effect in the [country] in which the allegedly
infringed right is protected” or to avoid confusion with the mark
owner in that country.198 And these steps should not
unreasonably burden the commercial activity the user carries out
the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and General Assembly of the
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Doc. 845(E), pmbl. (Oct. 2001)
[hereinafter Joint Recommendation on Internet Use] (setting forth provisions intended to
apply when determining whether “use of a sign on the Internet has contributed to the
acquisition, maintenance or infringement of a mark or other industrial property right in
the sign, or whether such use constitutes an act of unfair competition”).
195. See id. art. 2 (“Use of a sign on the Internet shall constitute use in a Member
State for the purposes of [determining whether such use establishes, maintains, or
infringes industrial property rights or constitutes an act of unfair competition], only if the
use has a commercial effect in that Member State as described in Article 3.”).
196. The factors are nonexhaustive and include whether the user is doing, or
planning to do, business in a particular state (although use of the sign can have a
commercial effect in a country without the user doing business there). The language and
currency used on the website where the mark is used, as well as any explicit disclaimer of
the ability to deliver goods in a particular state, would be relevant. Actual restraints on
the ability of the producer to deliver goods (for example, regulatory hurdles) would also
provide guidance, as would whether the website had actually been visited by persons from
a particular state. The interactivity of the website might also be an important factor. The
full listing of factors is found in Article 3 of the Joint Recommendation on Internet Use.
See id. art. 3. For an analysis of the wisdom of the particular factors listed, see Dinwoodie,
Private International Aspects, supra note 44, paras. 103–05.
197. Joint Recommendation on Internet Use, supra note 194, art. 2.
198. Id. at Notes, ¶ 10.02.
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over the Internet.199
The Joint Recommendation on Internet Use further suggests
that national courts granting a remedy against infringing
Internet use consider the effect that any injunction would have in
other states; any remedy should be proportionate to the
200
commercial effect in a particular state. Furthermore, a court
could “take account . . . of the number of Member States in which
the infringed right is also protected, the number of Member
States in which the infringing sign is protected by a right, or the
relative extent of use on the Internet.”201 In particular, the
remedies should not force a user who has rights in a mark in one
country to wholly abandon use of the mark on the Internet if the
user has acted in good faith.202
Whereas developments with respect to well-known marks—
and the approach of the majority in International Bancorp to the
question of “use” under domestic U.S. law—suggest an erosion of
the principle of territoriality fully understood, the Joint
Recommendation on Internet Use is a commendable effort to
employ the principle of territoriality constructively in a global
online environment. It is informed by both intrinsic and
pragmatic notions of territoriality. Ironically, although both
International Bancorp and the developments in the protection of
well-known marks appear to be motivated by a desire to reflect
the realities of global markets and to facilitate the ready
acquisition of rights on a broader geographic basis, they may in
fact impede global commerce. In the Internet context, I have
previously commented that too broad a view of use
would significantly increase the cost of trademarks, and
hence of goods to consumers. It would convert truly local
uses into global uses, giving rise to innumerable conflicts,
causing the depletion of available marks, and eviscerating
the concept of local use through which trademark law has
facilitated co-existence of marks in the past.
With respect to existing marks, this might cause
producers currently operating offline with legitimately

199. See id. If those steps include the use of a disclaimer in accordance with the
terms of Article 9 of the Recommendation, the user is conclusively presumed to have
satisfied the standard. Such disclaimers should, inter alia, make clear that the user of the
sign does not intend to deliver goods to the particular member state where a conflicting
right exists and that the user has no relationship with the owner of the conflicting right.
200. See Joint Recommendation on Internet Use, supra note 194, art. 13(1).
201. Id. at Notes, ¶ 13.04.
202. Such global injunctions are expressly prohibited by Article 14. Id. at Notes,
¶ 14.01. The provisions contain examples of alternative remedial options (such as gateway
webpages). Id. art. 14.
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acquired trademark rights from expanding into the online
environment lest they interfere with competing rights in
other countries. . . . All that the domestic producer acquires
through ownership of the domestic rights is the
corresponding capacity (assuming that the courts where the
domestic producer owns rights are similarly intrusive) to
prevent the foreign producer from using its legitimate
foreign rights online for its own domestic purposes.
Trademark rights are thus reduced to their most
destructive form, namely, a mutual ability to undermine
the sales efforts of competitors in other countries by
blocking certain commercially significant uses. This
“mutual blocking” capacity is neither efficient nor a positive
contribution to the globalization of markets or the
203
development of ecommerce.

The same is true of global commerce generally, and the Joint
Recommendation on Internet Use, unlike International Bancorp
or the different developments regarding well-known marks,
recognizes that unduly liberal attitudes regarding the grant of
rights may result in a cluttering of the marketplace. Such clutter
may create barriers to, rather than facilitate, global commerce.
B. Nonterritorial (and Foreign) Legal Norms
1. Convergence of National Legal Norms: Public International
Trademark Law. Despite the continuing nationality of trademark
law norms, in recent years a variety of harmonization initiatives
have effected a substantial convergence of substantive norms.
The TRIPS Agreement and regional harmonization have
contributed significantly to this trend. The three nonbinding
recommendations emanating from the SCT and adopted by the
general assemblies of the WIPO and the Paris Union have
contributed toward a confluence of standards in the areas of wellknown marks, use, and trademark licensing. And, procedurally,
the Trademark Law Treaty has minimized the inefficiencies of
serial national applications by encouraging standardized
procedural
requirements
in
trademark
registration
applications.204 These public law developments do not detract,
however, from the basic principle of territoriality. Instead, they
minimize, but do not eradicate, the costs and inefficiencies that
flow from national rights by rendering more common the national
203. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects, supra note 44, paras. 54–55.
204. See Trademark Law Treaty, supra note 135, art. 3(1)(a), 3(7) (listing elements
that may be required in trademark registration applications and prohibiting contracting
parties from requiring elements beyond those in the list).
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legal norms that apply in a territorial system. In so doing, they
foster a climate that facilitates international commerce,
ironically creating further challenges for trademark law.
2. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP). The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN)205 requires every registrar issuing domain names
in the most commercially significant generic top-level domains to
include in its registration agreement a contractual provision
requiring domain name registrants to submit to the application of
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)
adopted by ICANN in late 1999.206 As a result, cybersquatting
disputes between domain name registrants and trademark holders
may, at the insistence of the trademark owner, be resolved by quasiarbitral panels. While many disputes have been resolved instead in
national courts, the UDRP has become the international standard
for resolving cybersquatting disputes, representing a modest
departure from the territorial model both with respect to
enforcement and (more controversially) applicable norms.207
The enforcement mechanism developed by the UDRP,
namely, expeditious resolution largely based upon electronically
filed, bare-bones pleadings and settled by “administrative panels”
administered by ICANN-authorized dispute settlement
208
providers, is an obvious departure from the norm of national
trademark enforcement discussed above. The substantive rules
that the panels apply likewise represent a deviation from the
territorial model. The rules were developed in an unconventional
process of international intellectual property lawmaking
205. ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation created by the U.S. government to operate
the domain name system, among other things, in accordance with parameters set by the
Commerce Department. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741 (June 10, 1998); see also Internet Domain Names and Intellectual Property Rights:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 41 (1999) (statement of Michael Robert, Interim President and
CEO, ICANN) (explaining ICANN’s founding), available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/rove0728.htm. Among its domain-name related activities, ICANN authorizes
individual registrars to issue domain names in the generic top-level domains.
206. See generally Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999)
[hereinafter UDRP], http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
207. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Electronic
Commerce Work Programme: Submission from Australia, IP/C/W/2337, ¶ 44 (Dec. 7, 2000)
(suggesting that the UDRP has become the de facto international standard in
cybersquatting disputes), http://www.dfat.gov.au/ip/revised_aust_ecommerce.pdf. Since its
inception in 1999, more than 9300 proceedings have been brought under the UDRP.
ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last modified May
10, 2004).
208. UDRP, supra note 206, paras. 3–4.
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wherein, at the request of the United States, the World
Intellectual Property Organization drafted a report proposing the
rules in question, which ICANN then adopted.209
The substantive standards embodied in the UDRP (what a
complainant must show to prevail) are unconnected to any
particular national legal norm.210 The standards are purportedly
a context-specific application of the international norm
prohibiting unfair competition contained in Article 10bis of the
211
Paris Convention. And they are similar to norms that have
independently (although not without an eye to the UDRP) been
enacted or adopted in various national laws.212 A precise
characterization of the norms that apply in UDRP proceedings is
therefore difficult and probably unnecessary. Most importantly,
the applicable rules follow something other than the national
model described above.
To be sure, decisions under the UDRP are not necessarily
rendered without reference to national law. Trademark rights must
still be established under national law, and the legitimacy of a
213
respondent’s use of a mark might raise a question of national law.
Moreover, national norms clearly inform the development of the
rules of decision under the UDRP.214 Over time, however, panelists

209. This description does not do justice to the complexity of the process. For fuller
explanations, see generally Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing NonNational Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001) (analyzing in detail the development of the rules that
ICANN-authorized dispute settlement providers use to resolve cybersquatting disputes);
A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617,
626–29 (1999) (same); A. Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking:
Lessons Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process, at 14–26, at
http://www.law.miami.edu~froomkin/articles/tprc99.pdf (draft on file with Author) (Aug.
26, 1999) (reviewing UDRP as hybrid “dispute settlement creature that blended public
and private elements and that was not wholly ministerial, judicial, or arbitral in nature”).
210. See UDRP, supra note 206, para. 4 (setting forth the elements that a
complainant must show to prevail in a mandatory administrative proceeding). Rule 15 of
the UDRP Rules provides that panels should decide cases on the basis of “the statements
and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, the[] [UDRP] Rules and any
rules [or] principles of law that [they] deem[] applicable.” ICANN, Rules for Uniform
Domain
Name
Dispute
Resolution
Policy,
Rule
15
(Oct.
24,
1999),
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm.
211. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 10bis.
212. See, e.g., Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 to 1501A-552 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d) (2000)) (establishing a cause of action for cybersquatting).
213. See Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects, supra note 44, paras. 116–18
(discussing extent to which the UDRP is an autonomous body of law).
214. See, e.g., World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. Bosman, WIPO Case D99-0001,
para. 6, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/1999/d1999-0001.html (Jan. 14,
2000) (supporting interpretation of “use” requirement by referencing a decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
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have given weight to prior panel rulings, regardless of their
etymology. Decisions rendered on the basis of persuasive national
rules have been cited as embodying autonomous principles of UDRP
law, suggesting that the enforcement mechanism has acquired a
common law-like capacity to generate norms. The UDRP thus
effects, in a manner more complex than public international
harmonization, a shift from national trademark norms.
National trademark norms also inform the resolution of
cybersquatting disputes more directly than via their influence on
the UDRP. Trademark owners retain the right to proceed in
national courts instead of, or in addition to, bringing a complaint
under the UDRP,215 and many do. National law might provide
slightly more favorable standards, more extensive relief, or more
useful procedures. Moreover, even when a trademark owner
secures the return of the domain name through a UDRP
proceeding, that result can be overcome by a contrary
determination in a national court (a so-called “national
appeal”).216 And those national courts are not obliged to defer, or
even refer, to the conclusions of the UDRP panel; they apply
national law.217
Although in practice national “appeals” have rarely been
invoked, the ultimate (potential) national law control of the
UDRP process has been demonstrated in the few cases filed in
the U.S. courts. Lanham Act § 32(2)(D)(v), enacted by the AntiCybersquatting Protection Act (ACPA), permits domain name
registrants aggrieved by the loss of a UDRP proceeding, and
hence of their domain name registration, to file a claim before a
U.S. federal court seeking (1) a declaration that their domain
name registration violated no trademark rights under the
Lanham Act and (2) an order returning their domain name
registration. Two cases that have reached the federal appellate
courts in the United States have resulted in the overriding of
UDRP decisions and thus retention of the respective domain
names by the domain name registrants in question.218
In both cases, the success of the domain name registrants in
215. UDRP, supra note 206, para. 4(k).
216. Orders of UDRP panelists may be stayed by nothing more than the losing party
filing a complaint in the appropriate national court. Id.
217. See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d
617, 626 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that “any decision made by a panel under the UDRP is no
more than an agreed-upon administration that is not given any deference under the
ACPA”).
218. See id. at 625–29 (applying Lanham Act § 1114(2)(D)(c) and ordering the return
of the domain name to the domain name registrant); Sallen v. Corinthians
Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (reversing dismissal of an action
under § 32(2)(D)(v)).
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the U.S. courts was due not so much to the application of the
legal norms found in the Lanham Act, which—post-ACPA—do
not deviate much from the standards found in the UDRP. Indeed,
to the extent that there are differences, the provision introduced
by the ACPA may be more favorable to the trademark owner.
Rather, the claim adjudicated in the UDRP proceeding rests
upon the existence of trademark rights anywhere. The claim
adjudicated under the ACPA relies upon the existence of U.S.
trademark rights. Thus, even in the “inherently international”
context of cybersquatting disputes, the national model of rights,
norms, and enforcement remains ultimately dominant in theory,
although still substantially modified in practice given the rarity
of national appeals.
In the second of these decisions, Barcelona.com, Inc. v.
Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona,219 the district court
judge attempted to break the model even more dramatically.
There, a Spanish national registered the domain name
220
“barcelona.com” in the name of his wife. The City of Barcelona
owns rights in Spain for various marks that include the name
BARCELONA, although it owns no trademark rights in the name
221
BARCELONA as such. And it owned no rights in the United
States. The City of Barcelona successfully filed a complaint under
the UDRP. When the owners of Barcelona.com filed a complaint
under Lanham Act § 32(2)(D)(v), the district court upheld the
claim of the City of Barcelona because foreign trademark rights
could be enforced under the ACPA.222
The district court in Barcelona.com reasoned,
In the text of the statute Congress makes no
distinction between United States or foreign marks, even
though trademark law has historically been governed and
regulated on a national level. However, this law was framed
to govern the registration of domain names on the Internet,
and the framers were perfectly aware of the international
nature of the Internet when enacting the law. . . . It is
untenable to suppose that Congress, aware of the fact that
the Internet is so international in nature, only intended for
U.S.
trademarks
to
be
protected
under
the
Anticybersquatting statute. . . . For these reasons, this
Court is of the opinion that the Spanish trademark
223
“Barcelona” is valid for purposes of the ACPA.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

189 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 373–74.
Id.
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The district court’s decision would have radically revised one of
the pillars of territoriality. Although the opinion reads
suspiciously like an appellate review of the UDRP panel decision,
the district court purported to be applying U.S. law. Thus, the
opinion would have effected a rather convoluted reconfiguration
of the territoriality principle: it would have permitted a U.S.
court to protect a Spanish mark against acts in the United States
under U.S. law. But the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision,
reaffirming that U.S. trademark law offers protection only to
224
U.S. trademark rights. This decision raises, but inadequately
addresses, whether a dispute effectively between Spanish parties
about the registration of a domain name consisting of a Spanish
city name and the conflict between that domain name and
Spanish trademark rights should be adjudicated under U.S.
trademark law. For present purposes, however, the decision’s
importance lies in its continued endorsement of the principle that
foreign trademark rights cannot be vindicated in U.S. courts or
under U.S. law.225
bis
3. Section 44 & Article 10 . Although international norms
are slowly intruding into trademark law through harmonization
and substantially shaping the outcome of cybersquatting
disputes, is it possible that international trademark norms might
be directly relied upon in U.S. courts? This seems unlikely
because the TRIPS Agreement, which contains the most
developed substantive norms, is not self-executing in the United
States.226 Looking at the text of the Lanham Act, however, there

224. Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
628–29 (4th Cir. 2003).
225. While foreign trademark rights still cannot be vindicated under the Lanham
Act, and thus have no offensive capacity, the existence of foreign rights might justify a
domain name registrant’s activity and thus negate the bad faith necessary to sustain a
claim for cybersquatting under those parts of the ACPA now codified in Lanham Act
§ 43(d). See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 233–35 (4th Cir.
2002) (noting that the statutory reference to “intellectual property rights” corresponding
to the domain name in dispute, which might explain and hence justify the domain name
registration, should not be territorially restricted). Thus, foreign trademark rights might
have a defensive capacity in limited circumstances such as cybersquatting claims. This is
particularly appropriate given the territorially unlimited reach of the ACPA, because it is
in the context of extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act that the defensive value of
foreign rights has long been recognized by U.S. courts. Refer to Part III.D.3 infra
(discussing extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act).
226. The leading context in which U.S. courts have been more receptive to direct
reliance on international standards is in the context of the Pan-American Convention.
See, e.g., British-Am. Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1585, 1588–89
(T.T.A.B. 2000) (relying on self-execution of the Pan-American Convention in the context
of a cancellation proceeding). Often, such claims will be duplicative of actions brought
under the Lanham Act because the standards are so close. See, e.g., Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 1674 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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appears to be an avenue for reliance on international norms.
Section 44(b) of the Act provides,
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any
convention or treaty relating to trademarks, . . . to which
the United States is also a party, . . . shall be entitled to the
benefits of this section under the conditions expressed
herein to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision
of such convention [or] treaty . . . , in addition to the rights
to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this
227
chapter.
More specifically, under § 44(h), foreign citizens are entitled to
228
protection against unfair competition, an obligation imposed on
bis
the United States by Article 10 of the Paris Convention.229
Most courts have adopted the position that these provisions
offer no greater protection than would be available under the
explicit causes of action in Lanham Act §§ 32 and 43. This issue
has recently been revived in the U.S. courts. Recognition of the
possibility of a cause of action under § 44 for a violation of Article
10bis has, however, been forthcoming only at the district court
level.230 Reaction in the appellate courts appears more skeptical.
Historically, the Vanity Fair opinion was often cited for the
proposition that § 44 (and its express incorporation of the Paris
Convention) affords no relief beyond that already provided by the
Lanham Act. Indeed, one of the district courts holding to the
contrary appeared to read Vanity Fair in that manner.231
But, on the facts of Vanity Fair, the Second Circuit in that
case was only addressing whether § 44’s incorporation of the
Paris Convention expanded rights geographically by making
232
actionable conduct occurring outside the United States. This
arguably should not foreclose the possibility that the
incorporation of the Paris Convention by § 44 expanded rights in
some other way by making actionable conduct that does not
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000).
228. Id. § 1126(h).
229. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 10bis.
230. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lopez, 948 F. Supp. 684, 689 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding
that the Lanham Act incorporates the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention); see
also Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286,
1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that the “‘federal right created by subsection 44(h) [15
U.S.C. § 1126(h)] is co-extensive with the substantive provisions of the [Paris
Convention]’” (first alteration in original) (quoting Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645
F.2d 788, 792–93 (9th Cir. 1981))).
231. See Gen. Motors, 948 F. Supp. at 688.
232. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 644–45 (2d Cir. 1956)
(affirming lower court’s finding that allegedly infringing acts occurring in Canada do not
create a claim under U.S. law).
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violate the infringement provisions of the Lanham Act, but that
does fall within the scope of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.
A more recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
does, however, insist on this more absolute rejection of any
bis
reliance on Article 10 of the Paris Convention, as incorporated
233
by Lanham Act § 44. The court in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Inc.234 limited language in an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion,
suggesting that § 44 created rights coextensive with treaty
provisions, to the context of that earlier case, namely, a bilateral
treaty mandating national treatment.235 Thus, the use of § 44 to
incorporate substantive norms of the Paris Convention (such as
bis
Article 10 ) that exceed those in the Lanham Act has been
accepted only by district courts.236
A contrary interpretation of § 44, and indeed the one
suggested by the two district courts, would retain a territorial
(national) model of enforcement but incorporate international
bis
norms within that model. Indeed, to the extent that Article 10
of the Paris Convention is the international provision that a
plaintiff seeks to incorporate, the potential for the development of
bis
international norms is particularly significant. Article 10
requires protection against acts of unfair competition, including
“an[] act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial
237
or commercial matters.” Actions to enforce this provision in U.S.
courts would clearly rest upon the enforcement of an international
norm. But the content of that norm might be especially detached
from the territorial model. The leading commentator on the Paris
Convention suggests that in determining what are “honest
practices,” courts should take into account “honest practices
established in international trade.”238 As the development of
international arbitration and the lex mercatoria attest,
international commercial entities have a much greater tendency
than political actors to develop norms and practices detached from
the nation-state. At present, however, that prospect has not found
support at the appellate level in the United States.

233. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2002)
(limiting benefits of § 44 to the right of national treatment); Int’l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard
Rock Cafe Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2001) (same).
234. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
235. See id. at 907.
236. See, e.g., Gen. Motors, 948 F. Supp. at 689; Maison Lazard et Compagnie v.
Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
237. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 10bis.
238. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 104, at 144.
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4. Conclusions Under Application of Foreign Norms. As the
decision in Barcelona.com suggests, there remains a resistance in
trademark law to protect rights asserted under foreign
239
trademark laws. Yet, in the context of the doctrine of foreign
equivalents, the Second Circuit has indicated a greater
willingness to look to the decisions of foreign trademark offices to
ascertain the meaning of foreign terms as used in the United
States.240
241
In Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., a dispute
arose between two importers of Japanese sake regarding whether
the word “otokoyama,” in which one party held a U.S.
242
The district court reasoned that
registration, was generic.
“‘[t]he meaning of a term outside of the United States is
irrelevant’ to a determination of entitlement to the protection of
the U.S. trademark laws,” and thus refused to consider evidence
of the meaning and usage of “otokoyama” in Japan.243 The court
also refused to consider a ruling of the Japanese Patent Office
denying plaintiff’s application for trademark protection on the
ground that “otokoyama” is generic.244 The Second Circuit found
both decisions erroneous. The court expressed concern that
[i]f otokoyama in Japanese signifies a type of sake, and one
United States merchant were given the exclusive right to
use that word to designate its brand of sake, competing
merchants would be prevented from calling their product by
the word which designates that product in Japanese. Any
Japanese-speaking customers and others who are familiar
with the Japanese terminology would be misled to believe
that there is only one brand of otokoyama available in the
245
United States.
The decision of the Japanese Patent Office should have been
admitted because, although rights (or lack of rights) in the
United States cannot rest on the determination of a foreign
trademark office, the decision might have been offered to prove
239. Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiendo de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
628 (4th Cir. 2003) (“United States courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce
trademark rights that exist only under foreign law.”).
240. See, e.g., Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc. 175 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir.
1999); see also Orto Conserviera Sameranese di Giacchetti Marino & C. v. Bioconserve
S.R.L., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 2013, 2015 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (considering evidence of foreign usage
relevant to a determination of a mark’s genericness).
241. 175 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 1999).
242. Id. at 268.
243. Id. at 269 (alteration in original) (quoting Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan
Imp., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 372, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 272.
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particular facts.246 In this case, it was offered to prove, among
other things, that “the word otokoyama in Japanese refers to a
type or class of sake.”247
This liberalization in Otokoyama does not involve the
acceptance of foreign legal norms. The court was neither applying
Japanese trademark standards nor automatically accepting the
application of those standards by the Japanese Patent Office.
Rather, the court was apparently willing to read conventional
doctrine liberally to obtain assistance in ascertaining the facts
necessary to sustain the purposes of U.S. trademark law. The
court was seeking to effectuate the central concern that underlies
the domestic generic mark doctrine—preventing the grant of
control over an entire product market to a single producer—in an
era of global trade in which foreign-language branded goods are
readily purchased in the United States and in which familiarity
with foreign language is deemed more common.
Whether this latter assumption is valid within the United
States is debatable, but the court at least recognized the social
realities that might make meaning abroad more relevant to
meaning at home. The court seemed to recognize that even where
trademark rights and legal norms are national, the social
understanding of a term may be common.
Like the courts in International Bancorp, Grupo Gigante,
and Empresa Cubana, the Otakayama court is concerned with
vindicating the intrinsic consumer protection purposes of
domestic trademark law. As domestic consumers begin to
interact globally and international commerce proliferates, the
territorial character of goodwill will inevitably change. One
might also justify departure from precedent in this area on
grounds of international economic policy and a desire to enable
marks freely used in a country of primary manufacture to be
used in global trade. This motivation, which is rooted more in the
values of economic expansion and free trade, has appeared to
influence one court applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents.248
246. Id. at 273.
247. Id. at 273. It was also offered as evidence of plaintiff’s fraud on the U.S.
trademark office because the plaintiff had represented to the examiner that the term was
not an “‘arbitrary, fanciful term . . . [that] cannot be translated.’” Id. The decision of the
Japanese Patent Office was clearly relevant to this question.
248. In Orto Conserviera, the defendant had registered BELLA DI CERIGNOLA as
its trademark for olives. Orto Conserviera Sameranese di Giacchetti Marino & C. v.
Bioconserve S.R.L., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 2013, 2013 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The plaintiff sought
cancellation of the mark on the ground that “Bella di Cerignola” is a generic term used to
describe a particular type of olive. Id. The court concluded that the term was generic in
both Italy and the United States, but noted that “[e]ven if the Court were to conclude that
‘Bella di Cerignola’ had not yet become generic in this country, it would be reluctant to
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But economic policy is ground upon which it is dangerous for
courts to tread, and courts are thus more likely to support
modifications of territoriality-grounded rules by reference to
shifts in consumer understanding than to the desirability of a
new approach to international economic policy. These changes
can, as we have seen, be rooted in the intrinsic purpose of
trademark law.
C. Centralized Acquisition Mechanisms and Broader Unitary
Rights
1. Madrid Protocol. The Madrid Protocol contained several
improvements to the Madrid Agreement that allowed the United
States to enter the international system for the registration of
marks. U.S. membership in the Madrid system should greatly
facilitate the acquisition by U.S. applicants of rights on a
multinational basis. One of the primary reasons for the United
States’ refusal to adhere to the Madrid Agreement was the severe
consequence that flowed from cancellation of the “home”
registration, upon which extensions of protection in other
countries were based.249 Under the Madrid Agreement, home
registration cancellation caused all dependent extensions of
protection to fail.250 Because U.S. registrations were vulnerable to
prior marks that were unregistered, the United States viewed the
dependency of extensions as particularly harmful to U.S. users of
the system. Under the Madrid Protocol, if a home registration is
canceled, any extensions of protections are still canceled.251 But the
permit defendants to use it as a trademark for olives because to do so would preclude
producers of Italian olives from selling them using the generic designation by which they
are known in the country of origin.” Id. at 2014–15. The district court rejected as “too
parochial for the modern world of international commerce” the conventional rule that
refused to consider whether a term was generic in another country. Id. at 2015. But see
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 642 (8th Cir. 1984) (following
the conventional rule not to consider use of a term in another country, and affirming
lower court’s decision to disregard evidence of a term’s use in Australia); Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1976) (concluding that a term
may be generic in one market and not generic in another); Seiko Sporting Goods USA, Inc.
v. Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Tokeiten, 545 F. Supp. 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (asserting
that a generic term in Japan can still be arbitrary or fanciful in the United States). The
Orto Conserviera decision goes further than Otokoyama, but it was affirmed by the Second
Circuit; it seems committed more to the creation of a global market than to traditional
trademark concerns.
249. See generally Samuels & Samuels, supra note 130, at 443–44 (analyzing the
United States’ refusal to accede to the Madrid Agreement).
250. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 57, art. 6(3).
251. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
arts. 6(3), 6(4), WIPO Doc. 204(E) (June 27, 1989) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]; 15
U.S.C.A. § 1141j(a) (West Supp. 2004).
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trademark owner may, by refiling with the national office in
question within three months of cancellation of the international
registration, transform its Madrid-based international registration
into a national filing and retain the same priority date as was
afforded the international registration.252
253
The accession of the United States, and the recent addition
254
of Spanish as a working language of the Madrid system, should
substantially encourage use of the system. As with applicants
wishing to take advantage of the benefits of § 44(d) and § 44(e),
applicants under the Madrid system will need to standardize
their marks and the goods for which registration is sought. Thus,
the availability of this procedure, and the need for identity, is
likely to further hasten the process of global marketing.
2. Community Trade Mark. Under the Madrid system, the
applicant obtains a bundle of national trademark rights, thus
effecting a departure from the national model of administration
while preserving the territoriality of rights and norms. Several
regional trading blocs have, however, gone further and created
unitary trademark rights throughout a supranational area. The
most notable of these is the Community Trade Mark (CTM), now
available as a means of securing trademark rights throughout
the European Union.255 Because the CTM system is (unlike the
Madrid system) an open system, U.S. applicants have been active
participants. Indeed, U.S. companies have filed a greater number
of applications than entities from any other single country.256
252. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 251, art. 9quinquies. The transformation procedure
in U.S. law is contained in § 70(c) of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1141j(c) (2000).
253. The United States deposited its instrument of ratification of the Madrid Protocol
with WIPO on August 2, 2003. The necessary implementing legislation was enacted, and
the United States thus became part of the Madrid system as of November 2, 2002. See
Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1913–21
(2002).
254. Pursuant to a decision of the WIPO Assemblies and the Madrid Union, as of
April 1, 2004, Spanish became the third working language of the Madrid system. Press
Release, WIPO, Spanish Becomes Working Language of International Trademark System,
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipo_pr_2004_379.html (Apr. 1, 2004).
Previously, many Latin American countries were hesitant to use the system, which
functioned in French (the Madrid Agreement) or French and English (the Madrid
Protocol). Expanding the languages in order to encourage greater global involvement in a
system also raises transactional costs and incites passionate nationalistic reactions, as
the European Union has seen in trying to craft language compromises in the operation of
its CTM and proposed Community Patent systems.
255. See Council Regulation No. 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 3 [hereinafter CTM
Regulation].
256. Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, Statistics: Community Trade
Mark (CTM) & Community Designs (RCD) Applications Breakdown by Country, 1 OAMI
NEWS 3 (2004) (ranking the United States as the country with the highest number of
applications from 1996 through 2003, having filed 24.27% of all applications during that
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The transition from national trademark rights within
Europe to the CTM system (working in combination with
national systems and rights) may provide another model, along
with the development of U.S. federal registration in 1946, for any
effort to move away from a nationally rooted system as global
markets develop further. Several aspects differentiate the CTM
model from the approach adopted in the Lanham Act. Most
importantly, however, as adopted in 1994, the CTM system
placed greater emphasis on the unitary character of rights
257
than did the Lanham Act. The unitary character of the CTM
presents opportunities for substantial cost-savings for
producers within the EU, because rights in that large trading
area can be secured with a single application, and use in a
single country is sufficient to maintain a valid EU-wide
trademark registration. But the supposed unitary nature of
the system means that an application will be defeated if it
would be unregistrable in any single EU country.258 In
particular, the existence of prior conflicting rights in a single
country will defeat the CTM application and cause the
applicant to convert the CTM into separate national
applications filed with the various national offices.259 As
discussed above, even after enactment of the Lanham Act, the
United States continued to recognize the coexistence of local
rights and federal registrations.
The strict approach to unitary rights posed a potential
problem even when the EU consisted of fifteen countries. With
the expansion of the EU to twenty-five countries on May 1,
2004, the problems have intensified. Of course, that expansion
created an additional dilemma: what to do with “unitary”
time period), http://oami.eu.int/pdf/diff/oaminews1-04.pdf.
257. Article 1(2) of the CTM Regulation provides that “[a] Community trade mark
shall have a unitary character. It shall have equal effect throughout the Community.”
CTM Regulation, supra note 255, art. 1(2).
258. This raises a problem especially for marks that are descriptive and thus initially
unregisterable. Proving secondary meaning throughout the EU becomes a hard task. See,
e.g., Case R 20/97-1, USA Detergents Inc.’s Application, 1998 E.T.M.R. 562, 565–66
(OHIM Bd. App.) (rejecting application of XTRA for laundry detergent under CTM
Regulation Article 7(1)(b)–(c) after considering the meaning of the aurally equivalent term
“extra” in English, French, Spanish, Italian, and Dutch dictionaries and concluding that
“in at least five of the official languages of the European Union the word ‘EXTRA’ may be
used . . . to denote products of superior quality”).
259. Prior conflicting rights may consist of a number of different earlier rights:
applications or registrations for CTMs, applications or registrations in a member state of
the EU or the Benelux, international registrations having effect in an EU member state,
marks that are well-known in an EU member state, and even unregistered marks or other
signs that are of more than mere local significance (provided that the law of the member
state governing such mark or sign grants its proprietor the right to prohibit the use of a
subsequent mark). See CTM Regulation, supra note 255, arts. 8, 42.
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CTMs granted between 1996 and 2004 that were now in
conflict with national trademarks in the ten newly acceding
member states. Here, the model of the Lanham Act was more
closely followed. From the date of accession, a CTM registered
or applied for before the date of accession will be extended to
the territory of the ten new member states and will then have
equal effect throughout the enlarged European Community.260
However, holders of earlier rights in new member states can
enforce their rights against extended CTMs as permitted by
their respective national legislation, provided that the earlier
right was registered, applied for, or acquired in good faith in
the new member state prior to the date of accession of that
state.261
The extended CTM would be valid and enforceable in the
entire EU, including the new Member State, but not
against an earlier conflicting national right. The extended
CTM would thus not only not be enforceable against an
earlier national right, but the holder of such a right [could]
262
prohibit the use of the extended CTM in his territory.
The revision to the territoriality principle that the CTM
effects (i.e., the territorial expansion of the scope of rights) is of
course a product of changes to the relevant political and
policymaking institutions within Europe. It thus stands in
contrast to the de facto territorial extension of rights that result
from the decisions in International Bancorp, Grupo Gigante, and
Empresa Cubana, which were grounded in the intrinsic
territoriality of goodwill.
D. The National Enforcement Model
The national enforcement doctrines discussed in Part II have
undergone some slight modification in recent years. For example,
as noted above, the enforcement mechanism of the UDRP is in
some respects a departure from the national enforcement model.
And, as discussed below, U.S. courts have indicated greater
260. See Council Regulation 3288/94 of 22 December 1994 Amending Council
Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, art. 142a(1), 1994
O.J. (L 349) 342. For such registrations or applications, enlargement will not affect
validity regarding absolute grounds that only apply because of the accession of new
member states. For example, should an existing CTM registration consist of a word that
is descriptive in the language of one of the new member states, this will not be a ground
for filing an invalidity claim. See id. art. 142a(4).
261. Id. art. 142a(5).
262. Communication No. 05/03 of the President of the Office of 16 October 2003
Concerning the Enlargement of the European Union in 2004, § II, para. 3, at http://oami.
eu.int/en/office/aspects/communications/05-03.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
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willingness to enforce the Lanham Act extraterritorially in light
of global commerce.263 However, the basic principle of national
enforcement remains clear and quite resilient, as illustrated by
the recent litigation between Microsoft and Lindows.com over the
status of the mark WINDOWS for operating systems software in
a number of countries.264
1. Hague Convention. Other than the UDRP, any shifts in
the national adjudication of trademark claims remain solidly at
the proposal stage. In the late 1990s, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law intensified its efforts to conclude a
convention on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in civil
265
and commercial matters. These efforts resulted in a series of
263. Most courts have stressed the need to act cautiously in imposing blanket
remedies that interfere with activities abroad. Refer to Part III.D.3 infra.
264. Microsoft alleged that Lindows’ use of the term LINDOWS (for an open source
Linux-based operating system with an interface that resembles Windows software) is an
infringement of its trademark in the term WINDOWS for operating systems. Microsoft
Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1220–21 (W.D. Wash. 2004). A trial of
that dispute, in which the defendant argued, inter alia, that the term WINDOWS has
become generic, has been pending in the United States for some time. Microsoft Corp. v.
Lindows.com Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1371, 1371–72 (W.D. Wash. 2002). While that trial was
pending, Microsoft initiated or threatened litigation against Lindows and its distributors
in several other countries including the Benelux and Sweden. Microsoft, 319 F. Supp. 2d
at 1221. Microsoft officials defended this strategy, declaring that “Microsoft must protect
its trademarks or risk losing them and that a ruling in the U.S. case would unlikely affect
overseas trademarks. ‘The resolution of the U.S. case doesn’t necessarily bind any other
country,’ [a Microsoft spokesman] said.” David Becker, Microsoft-Lindows Battle Expands
in Europe, at http://news.com.com/2100-7344-5116840.html (Dec. 8, 2003). Lindows
officials saw the new lawsuits differently, charging, “It’s a tactic to make us spend money
opening up all these new legal fronts . . . . It makes no sense to launch all these lawsuits
when in three months, this case will be decided in a U.S. court, and if we lose, we’ll
change our name, and it’s a nonissue.” Id. After the U.S. court declined to issue an
antisuit injunction against Microsoft pursuing its foreign litigation, see Microsoft, 319 F.
Supp. 2d at 1224, and decisions in Europe were favorable to Microsoft, Lindows decided to
change its name (initially overseas, but eventually in the United States).
265. The proposed Hague Convention was modeled in large part on the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, see Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229
(1969), as amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990),
the basic tenets of which have been repeated in the Brussels Regulation adopted by the
EU. See Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1. Operating under this treaty,
several European courts have consolidated related national intellectual property litigation
and granted cross-border relief. Although most of the leading cases involved patent
rights—typically national patent rights stemming from a common European patent—
some cases did address trademark claims. See, e.g., Case KG 97/1526, Kabushiki Kaisha
Yakult Honsha v. Danone Nederland BV, 1998 E.T.M.R. 465, 472, 479 (Hague Dist. Ct.
1998) (Neth.) (stating that “the system under the Brussels Convention requires that the
court . . . must apply foreign trade mark law in the appropriate cases,” but declining to
extend the injunction to France although “competent to do so” because of a lack of
urgency). These trends receded in the late 1990s as several national courts became
cautious about the adjudication of the validity of foreign registered rights. The scope of
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draft instruments that would, in different respects,266 have
permitted the consolidation of national trademark actions in a
single court (with consequent guaranteed enforcement by other
Hague members). Such a mechanism would have radically
revised the existing serial national litigation model as illustrated
by the Lindows.com dispute and by Vanity Fair.
Ultimately, the most ambitious forms of the instrument
encountered strong opposition, and intellectual property issues—
most notably those in industrial property cases—were among the
most controversial. If a broad agreement was to be reached, it
was clear that any determination of the validity of a trademark
would have to be contested only in the courts of the country that
issued the trademark registration. (The issue of how to deal with
unregistered trademark disputes was never fully resolved.) At
best, a court seized with jurisdiction under the treaty’s proposed
jurisdiction rules could adjudicate a claim of foreign trademark
infringement, including a question of validity if it arose as an
incidental question. But the traditional resistance to permitting a
foreign judge to pass on the validity of a trademark issued by
another country continued to raise questions about whether such
a judgment should automatically be enforceable, or enforceable
at all, in other countries of the Hague Conference.
The trademark issues were not the only ones attracting
controversy, however, and efforts to reach a broad agreement
stalled. Thus, the initiative was framed more narrowly, and the
current incarnation of the proposed Hague Convention would
essentially validate and require enforcement of exclusive choiceof-court clauses in business-to-business contracts. In essence, the
treaty seeks to extend the model of the New York Convention on
Recognition of Arbitral Awards to the court system. However, its

cross-border jurisdiction in patent cases within the EU is currently before the European
Court of Justice. See Case 593/03, Roche Nederland B.V. v. Primus, 2004 O.J. (C 59) 11.
Indeed, the members of the EU may believe that the CTM is the salvation (within
Europe) to the problems of national rights, and thus may be less inclined to pursue the
goal of consolidation-inspired treaties.
266. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission II,
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nineteenth
Session: Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of
the Diplomatic Conference, Interim Text (June 6–20, 2001), reprinted in 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1015, 1031 (2002) (including trademark law within the Convention but proposing
various alternatives by which the courts in the state of registration could be given
exclusive jurisdiction, at least when determining relief for matters related to the validity
of the mark); Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art.
12 (Oct. 30, 1999) (including intellectual property within the Convention but reserving
jurisdiction in certain matters to the state of registration), http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/draft36e.html.
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more curtailed scope of application would still have included
intellectual property contracts, thus permitting consolidation of
trademark claims in a narrow band of cases. As a result, some of
the same dilemmas regarding the appropriateness of
adjudicating foreign trademark (and patent) claims remained.
After a Diplomatic Conference in December 2003 again failed to
reach consensus,267 the project was further scaled back at another
Diplomatic Conference in April 2004, and the intention is now
that copyright will be the only intellectual property regime to be
a proper subject of the more limited Convention, which is hoped
to be adopted in early 2005.268 Consolidation of national
trademark claims in a single proceeding, therefore, remains an
elusive goal, even though it would have substantial value in a
world of global marketing.
Indeed, modification of the national enforcement system
through the consolidation of national claims might be the surest
way to ensure the continued vitality of separate national rights
and norms. Global or multinational relief through efforts at
extraterritorial enforcement by a single national court is
rendered less necessary when multinational relief can as easily
be obtained through consolidation of national claims. Yet courts
that adjudicate claims under, for example, twenty separate
trademark laws might be tempted to determine the entire
controversy under principles that reflect an amalgam of national
and international norms or, alternatively, under the most
dominant national norm. Indeed, if courts did not do so and tried
a case under twenty different laws, taking evidence with respect
to twenty different consumer markets, the costs savings over the
national enforcement model might become so small as to be
illusory. Pragmatic enforcement considerations might thus be the
catalyst for a court seized of consolidated litigation to apply a
single norm. There may in fact be circumstances in which
conflicts theory would support an international trademark

267. See Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Hague Conference on
Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Work. Doc. 49E
(revised), art. 1(3)(k) (Dec. 1–9, 2003) (providing that “[t]he Convention shall not apply to
proceedings that have as their object . . . the validity of . . . trademarks”).
268. It is not clear that the bracketed language in the current draft adequately
implements that objective. See Draft on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Work. Doc. 110E (revised), art. 2(2)(k) (Apr. 21–27, 2004) (providing that “[t]he
Convention shall not apply to . . . intellectual property rights other than copyright or
related rights, except in proceedings pursuant to a contract which licenses or assigns such
intellectual property”).
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dispute being resolved according to an international norm so
devised.269 But frequent disregard of the national components of
consolidation would undermine one of the arguments that
proponents of liberal consolidation (i.e., enforcement) mechanisms
can use to win over critics with residual attraction to national
rights and national norms.
2. American Law Institute Project on Principles Governing
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational
Intellectual Property Disputes. A more ambitious project,
resembling in some respects the initial Hague proposal, was
commenced by the American Law Institute (ALI) when it became
apparent that treaty provisions facilitating the consolidation of
intellectual property litigation were not likely to be agreed upon
270
at the Hague Conference. The ALI Project was motivated in
large part by the gains of consolidated litigation and the
departure from the model of serial national litigation. Indeed,
consolidation was a more dominant objective in the ALI Project
than in the Hague initiative. The ALI Project is, however, at an
early stage, and some of the same challenges are being
confronted. Because the ALI Project seeks to elaborate a set of
principles to which courts might voluntarily turn when
confronted with practical problems in transnational disputes,
rather than to create a binding instrument of international law,
it is hoped that a reconciliation might be more likely. But, as
with the Hague proposal, the ALI Project remains a work in
progress, and the national adjudication model persists.
3. Extraterritoriality. Nominally, the standards for
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act to restrain
allegedly infringing activities abroad have not changed of late.
But cases in the last decade have suggested that courts might be
willing to treat the doctrine more flexibly in order to
269. Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 542–52 (2000) (advocating the use of the
substantive law method to resolve international copyright disputes). There are likely to be
fewer circumstances in which a single analysis might appropriately resolve an
international trademark dispute than is the case in international copyright litigation. To
the extent that consumer understanding continues to vary substantially from one country
to another, global solutions might serve to undermine the basic purposes of trademark
law (though as much because of variations in the underlying factual issues, such as
consumer behavior, as because of widely disparate legal norms). But there may be some
small set of circumstances involving a global brand and unified global distribution
channels in which a less nationally rooted analysis might be appropriate.
270. See American Law Institute, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Intellectual Property
Disputes (Prelim. Draft No. 2, Jan. 20, 2004).
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accommodate the demands of global commerce. Most notably, in
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer,271 the court was willing to grant the
plaintiff (which owned U.S. rights in the mark BAYER) relief
against conduct abroad by Bayer AG, a German company that
owned rights to the BAYER mark in most countries of the world,
including Germany.272 For many years, the Second Circuit has
determined whether the Lanham Act should apply
extraterritorially by considering three factors, first announced in
Vanity Fair and based upon the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
273
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. The Vanity Fair Court held that the
statute would not be applied extraterritorially if two of the
following three factors were absent: (1) the defendant was an
American citizen, (2) there was a substantial effect on U.S.
commerce, and (3) there was no conflict with foreign rights.274
Thus, in Vanity Fair, the court refused to apply the Lanham Act
where the American owner of a U.S. trademark registration
sought to restrain use of the mark in Canada by a Canadian
defendant that owned the Canadian registration for the same
mark.275 Although the defendant’s use had a substantial effect on
U.S. commerce, the defendant was not a U.S. citizen and was the
legitimate owner of the mark under Canadian law.276
In Sterling Drug, the court of appeals acknowledged that
Vanity Fair should forbid the extraterritorial application of the
statute.277 However, the court remanded the case to the district
court to grant relief because “such an unrefined application of
that case might mean that we fail to preserve the Lanham Act’s
goals of protecting American consumers against confusion, and
protecting
holders
of
American
trademarks
against
misappropriation of their marks.”278 The court was willing to
contemplate relief because the Vanity Fair test was
unnecessarily strict when, rather than seeking an absolute
271. 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
272. Id. at 736.
273. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
274. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956)
(reviewing and applying Bulova Watch). Indeed, the Vanity Fair court hinted that the
presence of all three factors might be necessary to justify extraterritorial application. Id.
at 642–43.
275. See id. at 647–48 (affirming lower court’s refusal to consider trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims arising in Canada).
276. Id. at 643 (observing that the officers of the defendant corporation were
Canadian citizens and that they were “acting under presumably valid trade-marks in a
foreign country”).
277. Sterling Drug, 14 F.3d at 746 (“[I]f we applied the Vanity Fair test mechanically
to the instant case, we would forbid the application of the Lanham Act abroad against a
foreign corporation that holds superior rights to the mark under foreign law.”).
278. Id.
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injunction against foreign conduct, the plaintiff was seeking only
“the more modest goal of limiting foreign uses that reach the
United States.”279 The court acknowledged the sensitivities of the
international context and noted that, in a global economy with
technologically advanced communication, “not every activity of a
foreign corporation with any tendency to create some confusion
among American consumers can be prohibited by the
extraterritorial reach of . . . [an] injunction.”280
Bayer argued that foreign uses by Bayer that had an effect
in the United States were “the unavoidable result of an
international community of nations in which each nation
exercises the power to grant trademark rights,” but the Second
Circuit thought it possible to fashion relief that respected the
foreign trademark rights while requiring steps “reasonably
necessary to protect against significant trademark-impairing
281
effects on American commerce.”
Thus, although the sentiments of the Sterling Drug court
echo the comments of the majority in International Bancorp, the
Sterling Drug court adopted a more pragmatic solution that still
reflected its concern about domestic consumers in light of
contemporary travel patterns. The Second Circuit was not willing
to act upon the reality of goodwill that had transcended

279. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been resistant to a
broad-based relaxation of the Bulova factors. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Arco
Globus Int’l Co., 150 F.3d 189, 192 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the presence of
the first two of the Vanity Fair factors does not guarantee extraterritorial application of
the Lanham Act).
280. Sterling Drug, 14 F.3d at 747.
281. Id. Less sensitive extraterritorial application of U.S. law can be seen in the
context of the ACPA. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Constructing International Intellectual
Property Law: The Role of National Courts, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 1008 (2002) (noting
that the enactment of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act may encourage
“more intrusive [U.S.] judicial regulation of international domain name space”); Graeme
B. Dinwoodie, The Extended Reach of the ACPA: The Domination of Trademark Rights or
the Domination of U.S. Law, Eleventh Annual Fordham Conference on International
Intellectual Property Law and Policy, New York (maunuscript at 1) (Apr. 2003) (working
paper on file with Author) (suggesting that the ACPA is “an unduly broad geographic
extension of the reach of U.S. law”). But that is, in large part, a result of de facto U.S.
control of domain name registration. See Globalsantafe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250
F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (E.D. Va. 2003) (deciding whether under the ACPA, a U.S. “.com”
registry may cancel defendant’s domain name despite an injunction against doing so
issued by a foreign court); Am. Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457 (E.D. Va.
2003) (noting that the registry for defendant’s domain name was in the United States,
giving U.S. courts jurisdiction over the domain name). In online cases involving more
than merely ownership of the domain names, U.S. courts have tried more carefully to
craft extraterritorial relief that accommodates foreign rights. See Playboy Enters. v.
Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1040–41 (1996) (ordering defendant to
either shut down its Italian Internet site or refrain from accepting U.S. users, refund
current U.S. users’ money, and close their accounts).
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territorial boundaries without due regard to the pragmatic and
normative limits of U.S. sovereignty (which do reflect existing
territorial boundaries).
IV. THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE
The developments discussed in Part III reflect the
manufacture, marketing, and distribution of products in a global
market. Goods and services are no longer offered on a purely
national basis, thus putting the dominant premise of both
international conventions and Lanham Act registration at odds
with social and commercial reality. Many of the decisions and
instruments discussed above acknowledge, and are clearly
informed by, that reality. They refer to the “world economy,”282
283
note the inherently “international nature of the Internet,” seek
to protect American consumers who travel internationally,284 or
express concern about effects on competition between American
and foreign producers rather than between rival domestic
traders.285 In this global environment, doctrines built on the
premise of territorially limited markets have unsurprisingly
286
come under pressure to evolve.
It is rarer to see mention of political or administrative
realities, although those references that do occur normally signal
restraint and adherence to traditional models of territoriality. So
how should we reconfigure the territorial model to reflect both
substantial social change and the relative immutability of
political institutions? The territorial model of trademark law
encompasses both. If the Lanham Act represented a partial
282. See, e.g., Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(noting arguments that rules should be revised to reflect the “world economy”); Sterling
Drug, 14 F.3d at 743, 747 (acknowledging “today’s global economy” and revising rules
accordingly).
283. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189
F. Supp. 2d 367, 373–74 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
284. See, e.g., Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des
Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2003) (protecting the trademark of the
foreign defendant that conducted its business wholly overseas but advertised to
Americans who flew internationally to gamble at defendant’s casino).
285. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 233–34 (4th
Cir. 2002) (noting the relevance of competing foreign traders).
286. Of course, arguments about economic expansion had previously been made to no
avail. See Person’s, 900 F.2d at 1569 n.18 (rejecting arguments based on the “world
economy”). And not every court takes an international view of events that many
commentators might regard as international in nature. See Am. Online, 259 F. Supp. 2d
at 457 (“By choosing to register a domain name in the popular ‘.org’ top-level domain,
these foreign registrants deliberately chose to use a top-level domain controlled by a
United States registry. They chose, in effect, to play Internet ball in American
cyberspace.”).
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reconfiguration of the territorial model to reflect national
markets, how should that model be revised to accommodate
international markets? And should the territoriality principle be
reconsidered at the international level?
Part III of this paper offered critiques of several discrete
developments that represent a modification of the principle of
territoriality, as well as several inchoate or rejected efforts
toward that same objective. This Part suggests more thematic or
conceptual approaches. Of course, the multidimensional nature of
“the principle of territoriality” counsels caution in advancing a
single prescription. But efforts to rethink the territorial model, in
all its component parts, might be assisted by framing properly
the relevant inquiry and by tentatively sketching some of the
basic questions.
A. Framing the Inquiry
My inquiry into this question proceeds from two working
premises. First, it is ostrich-like to adhere to conventional
principles simply because to do so may seem easier analytically.
The problems precipitated by the increasingly amorphous nature
of goodwill, measured socially or empirically, surface in a
minority of trademark disputes at present, but the importance
and frequency of these problems are only likely to increase. Some
change is necessary. The shrinking globe and the relative decline
of the nation-state as the exclusive source of prescriptive
authority may mean that a reconfiguration is normatively and
pragmatically warranted.
Second, however, territoriality will still have an important
role to play in trademark law. Other scholars have suggested
that “the territorial model of trademark law . . . is an
anachronism” in the global market.287 But the vitality of the
principle of territoriality can only be assessed by considering the
full range of reasons why the principle pervades trademark law.
As suggested by the intrinsic nature and purposes of trademark
law, one cannot fully define goodwill as an empirical social
phenomenon without paying attention to its territorial reach.
And it is by reference to that social phenomenon that the
consumer protection purposes of trademark law, as opposed to
concerns of economic policy, are effectuated.
Territorial doctrines have furthered several other important
objectives of trademark law. Allowing trademark rights to extend

287. See, e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law,
2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998).
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(only) as far as the producer’s trade inevitably tethered the scope
of protection to the harms against which trademark law protects.
The common law principle of territorial rights thus
simultaneously afforded sufficient, but prevented excessive,
protection. And by limiting the rights of one producer, the
principle of territoriality protected separate goodwill that the
mark might embody elsewhere. Such restraint is valuable in an
economy of remote markets; it is essential in a world of multiple
overlapping markets.
National registration schemes successfully balanced the
intrinsic territoriality of common law rights with the pragmatic
demands of economic expansion. Those aspects of trademark
territoriality grounded in economic policymaking are unlikely to
change radically because such notions of territoriality are
connected to policymaking institutions that have proven more
resistant to the effects of global markets.
Finally, the national enforcement model and strict limits on
extraterritorial relief were consistent with conventional notions
of political sovereignty and institutional competence. No one
questioned the enforcement of judgments that purported to
protect local consumers and producers against conduct occurring
locally. The application of local legal norms by local adjudicators
(whether courts or trademark officials) lent an aura of legitimacy
and competence to decisions that those adjudicators rendered.
These officials were trained in applying those norms, and their
decisions were informed, as much trademark law can be, by
intuitive judgments about consumer understanding that were
likely to correspond to actual consumer understandings.288
Despite changes in social and commercial practices, enforcement
institutions remain steadfastly national.
B. Conceptual Alternatives
As discussed in Part II, the principle of territoriality is not a
unitary concept, and the doctrines that implement it have
assumed a territorial character for different reasons. But,
conscious of the dangers of offering a single prescription to a
multifaceted dilemma, I set out below three basic conceptual
approaches that might guide future approaches to territoriality
in trademark law.
288. The U.S. Supreme Court in particular seems fairly confident in generalizing
about consumer desires and reactions without empirical support. See Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Seventh Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in
Intellectual Property Law: The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187 (2004) [Dinwoodie, Trademark Jurisprudence].

(6)DINWOODIEG5

958

10/11/2004 12:02 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[41:3

1. Tying Trademark Rights to the Territoriality of
Goodwill. As markets increasingly come to be defined by
communities that do not mesh with political boundaries, allowing
trademark rights to conform consciously to the territorial reach
of goodwill regardless of political boundaries might help
trademark law adjust to and reflect social realities. This
approach would involve privileging the intrinsic consumer
protection purposes of trademark law over proactive economic
policy; it would exalt social and commercial patterns of activity
as the defining instruments of the scope of rights.
If we pursued this approach to territoriality, we might wish
to consider the scope of rights that we would likely confer on
trademark owners. Would global brands quickly establish
worldwide rights? What is the shape or reach of territorially
defined goodwill in the current marketplace? Many of the
developments discussed above presuppose that it frequently no
longer maps to national political boundaries. So, what shape will
goodwill take? The nature of the present-day market does not
simply reflect a linear progression from local to national to
global. The rise of global markets has not necessarily produced
unitary, geographically larger markets or unified consumer
understanding. Although such markets or understanding might
289
with respect to some products (especially
have developed
products designed specifically for an online consumer, such as
peer-to-peer software), this view of the move toward a global
economy is too simplistic. Such a view too easily buys into the
argument of global homogenization in ways, perhaps fortunately,
inconsistent with actual consumer reaction or producer
distribution and marketing. Linguistic and cultural differences,
wealth disparities, and varying patterns of economic activity and
structure continue to open up different geographic and social
markets for producers in a range of ways. And, even if producers
unwisely tried to ignore these differences, to create a single
global market, and to impose a single global understanding,
these same attributes would likely cause consumers, independent
of producer desires, to develop understandings far from
uniform—and might in some circumstances give rise to
trademark-relevant differences.290 Thus, implementation of this
289. To be sure, in addition to the creation of a few unitary markets, global trade has
increased the possibility that producers will market their wares internationally,
generating (and thus causing us to regulate) a collection of distinct, if related, bundles of
goodwill. And in some circumstances, those bundles all represent the same source, leading
in time toward a universal notion of goodwill. The Madrid Protocol, however, seems to be
a sufficient response for this dynamic at present.
290. There is one caveat to such postmodern concerns of individuated meaning.
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approach may be less simple than it first seems. Measuring the
(cross-border) territorial reach of goodwill in current markets
may be difficult, which might caution against adopting it as the
lodestar for trademark rights.
Moreover, scholars in other disciplines have commented on
291
the phenomenon of “glocalization,” whereby the globalization of
markets has been accompanied by a responsive effort to sustain
local identity in the face of, and sometimes through the use of,
global markets. Trademark rights, as reflectors of identity, are
thus stretched in both directions, locally and globally, though in
both cases the market is at odds with the dominant (if now
challenged) political sovereignty, namely, the nation-state.
Practical implementation concerns may thus be exacerbated by
such a phenomenon. By the same token, however, the
phenomenon of “glocalization” might make linking the scope of
rights to the intrinsic territoriality of goodwill seem especially
attractive. Tethering the scope of rights to social reality allows
both the expansion of rights where goodwill is global and the
confinement of rights where goodwill is local.
While this approach may seem radical, the principle of
defining trademark rights by reference to the territoriality of
goodwill is, of course, not new. It is where the common law
started. In his opinion in Hanover Star Milling, Justice Pitney
captured perfectly the theoretical independence of trademark
rights from political boundaries: “To say that a trade-mark right
is not limited in its enjoyment by territorial bounds, is
inconsistent with saying that it extends as far as the sovereignty
in which it has been enjoyed. If the territorial bounds of
sovereignty do not limit, how can they enlarge such a right?”292
U.S. law, as one of the few use-based systems in the world,
would seem well suited to accommodate this approach. If we seek
to link rights to the expanding social reach of goodwill, we will
inevitably rely on doctrines of use and, subsidiarily, the principle
of well-known marks. The decisions of U.S. courts in
International Bancorp, Grupo Gigante, and Empresa Cubana (as
well as the international development of the well-known mark
Differences in the reaction of one group of consumers as opposed to another do not
necessarily mean the presence of two discrete bundles of goodwill. If both groups associate
the mark with the same source, that is unitary goodwill (even if it is viewed more
favorably in one locale than in the other). This is not a result merely of geographic
difference. For some shoppers, WAL-MART for retail stores means value; for others it
might mean “low-quality.” Regardless, it is a single mark with single goodwill.
291. Eric Swyngedouw, Neither Global nor Local: ‘Glocalization’ and the Politics of
Scale, in SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL 137 (Kevin
Cox ed., 1997).
292. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916).
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doctrine) appear committed to the notion that if the unused,
unregistered marks have meaning to American consumers, that
meaning should be protected. That is, these opinions appear to
reflect the actual scope of goodwill, regardless of the industrial
policy that political authorities might wish to pursue. They thus
provide some measure of the wisdom of tying trademark rights to
its intrinsic territoriality.
As suggested above, one criticism of these developments is
that the rules disfavor American trademark owners and
substantially increase searching costs for trademark applicants.
This is not to suggest that U.S. (or international) law should not
make provisions for the foreign producer who wishes efficiently
to develop and exploit goodwill among American consumers. The
mechanisms that hitherto have addressed such a scenario are the
telle quelle principle (implemented in Lanham Act § 44(e)) and,
to a lesser extent historically, the well-known mark doctrine.293
But the foreign user who relies instead on U.S. advertising and
foreign use (under International Bancorp) or secondary meaning
developed in the United States without use (under Empresa
Cubana) is placed in a better situation than the foreign mark
owner who takes advantage of the telle quelle procedure required
by the Paris Convention and explicitly incorporated by the
Lanham Act § 44. Under § 44(e), the foreign producer can obtain
a registration without use,294 but the registration will be canceled
if use does not take place within the statutory time period.295 The
293. Although a requirement that a mark owner render services in the United States
to secure U.S. common law rights would not preclude foreign producers from obtaining
rights in the United States under § 44(e) prior to establishing a business here, the
majority in International Bancorp was insistent that foreign producers should be entitled
to rely on unregistered rights to the same extent as local producers. See Int’l Bancorp, 329
F.3d at 382 & n.14 (“It is inconceivable that courts would interpret the Lanham Act to
punish [foreign] mark owners for failing to register their mark where their mark
otherwise meets the statutory requirements for protection.”). This articulation of the issue
(avoiding antiforeigner discrimination) clearly presents the argument as rhetorically
inconsistent with the Paris Convention and TRIPS’ national treatment obligations. But a
rule on the meaning of “use” that instead simply accords different weight to foreign and
domestic use clearly comports with the underlying treaty premise of territoriality; it may
be quite appropriate, as a concession to some of the prescriptive claims of territoriality, to
require a foreign user to register to acquire rights but not to make the same demand of a
domestic user. And it may be that the increasingly contested trade environment in which
international trademark law is developing should make courts cautious before adopting
such an avowedly internationalist (albeit pro-U.S. consumer) position as the International
Bancorp majority advocates, even if it is consistent with the territorial goodwill premises
of domestic U.S. trademark law.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2000) (allowing registration by foreign user based on intent
to use).
295. Refer to note 86 supra (discussing Linville v. Rinard, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1508
(T.T.A.B. 1993)). To minimize this problem, one might argue that efforts to defeat
cancellation cannot be based on fame without use. See Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip
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remedies that are available to a § 44(e) applicant absent use are
likewise restricted because it is unlikely that there will be
consumer confusion in such circumstances. Given the problems of
clutter and conflict that flow from liberal globalization of rights,
an approach that does not undermine use of international
registration mechanisms (which at least provide notice and
transparency) is surely to be preferred.296
Yet, by the same token, as consumers engage in world travel
in unprecedented numbers, and as modern technology allows
images and marks to cross borders in advance of consumers and
goodwill, refusal to recognize use-based rights such as those
protected in International Bancorp, Grupo Gigante, and Empresa
Cubana creates a risk that American consumers will be confused.
To permit such confusion would allow inefficiencies to persist in
the domestic economy. Thus, the approach of these courts
appears grounded in the basic purposes of U.S. trademark law: to
wit, the protection of American consumers in an era of world
travel and global information flows, though apparently at the
expense of American producers, especially those less
commercially interested in globetrotting consumers or global
297
markets.
In making the choice between these arguably unpalatable
options—uncertainty and clutter, or confusion—it is important to

Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1579–80 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (canceling foreign defendant’s
trademark registration for lack of use in the United States); cf. Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1650, 1691 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (canceling domestic
defendant’s trademark registration for lack of use and upholding foreign plaintiff’s
trademark in the United States because of excused nonuse resulting from U.S. embargo
against Cuban products). This has great merit in preventing end-runs around § 44(e), but
it is not logically consistent with the well-known mark doctrine.
296. The liberal attitude that each case adopts toward the existence of secondary
meaning further ensures that § 44(e), the means by which the Lanham Act explicitly
confers rights on foreign producers without use in the United States, becomes an
increasingly irrelevant provision notwithstanding the development of global markets.
Refer to notes 162–82 supra and accompanying text.
297. One could regard this as a choice of consumer interests over producer
interests—though, of course, producer costs are ultimately passed on to American
consumers—or of internationally minded interests over domestically oriented interests.
These two vectors no doubt intersect, but their mutual presence merely highlights the
complexity of international trademark law, which must attend not only to the substantive
balance essential to domestic trademark dilemmas, but also to the now-omnipresent
battle between internationalism and nationalism. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private
Ordering and the Creation of International Copyright Norms: The Role of Public
Structuring, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 161, 161–62 (2004) (noting the
difficulty in balancing national versus international interests with respect to copyrights);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: New Actors,
New Institutions, New Sources, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 98TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. (manuscript at 5–7) (forthcoming 2004) (discussing the two different
balances).
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bear in mind a dichotomous choice that trademark law
frequently encounters but is insufficiently addressed (or at least
not explicitly) in trademark scholarship. That is, should
trademark law be structured reactively to protect whatever
consumer understandings or producer goodwill develops, or
should it proactively seek to shape the ways in which consumers
shop and producers sell or seek to acquire rights, thus shaping
how the economy functions.298 Should trademark law reflect social
norms or aspire to create them?
If the reactive school of thought prevails, the increasingly
nonnational (though no less intrinsically territorial) nature of
goodwill suggests that the majority in International Bancorp and,
to a lesser extent, the courts in Grupo Gigante and Empresa
Cubana are properly engaged with the basic objectives of
trademark law, but pursued in the context of a global market. A
reactive theorist would tend to elevate the intrinsic social aspects
of territoriality and to protect the goodwill that the global market
engenders.
In contrast, a proactive theorist might seek solace in the
politically grounded aspects of territoriality and the practical
value of national rights. Under this philosophy, parties desirous
of international protection would be encouraged to use the
efficiency-enhancing mechanisms of § 44(e) and the Madrid
Protocol, and certainty would be promoted through a narrow
interpretation of “use in commerce.” A proactive approach would
facilitate the further, or perhaps more orderly, development of
the global market through more transparent international
trademark acquisition devices or international enforcement
reforms. These priorities would thus accommodate and promote
global markets without interfering with the interests of
producers who wish to market locally unburdened by the costs of
global trade or of subsidizing global producers. This balancing of
interests does appear to reflect the fuller range of different
constituencies that the trademark system is trying to serve in the
current marketplace.
That the instrumental, proactive argument appears to
elevate the value of registration systems in a global market
might be an irony lost on adherents to the traditional American
approach. Instrumentalism in intellectual property law is more

298. This debate is also acute in the area of product-design trade dress protection.
The implicit message of several recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions is that producers
should seek to encourage identification with their products through verbal rather than
design marks. See generally Dinwoodie, Trademark Jurisprudence, supra note 288, at 209
(raising the proactive-reactive dilemma).
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naturally the philosophy of U.S. law. But the domestic
territoriality-based principles regarding the “reach of goodwill”
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United Drug and
Hanover Star Milling have since 1946 been subject to the equally
territoriality-based principles of national rights, consciously
rendering the treatment of international disputes different from
the treatment of domestic disputes.299 Both the majority and the
dissent in International Bancorp can claim the mantle of the
United Drug and Hanover Star Milling Courts. Both
accommodate territoriality-based concerns into their analysis;
but they focus on different aspects of the territoriality principle.300
The difference between them rests on the willingness of the
majority to cast off the nationality overlay imposed on
territoriality—something that federal appellate courts had
previously resisted even when presented with arguments that
301
the global market altered the traditional calculus. To do so, the
International Bancorp majority elevates the intrinsic trademark
notion of territoriality over the international trademark notion of
nationality, thereby privileging the social aspects of territoriality
over its political properties.302
Indeed, it is worth recalling that even in the domestic
context we have modified our strict assimilation between the
scope of rights and territorial goodwill to pursue complementary
303
values such as economic expansion or producer certainty. And,
as seen in cases adjudicating relief where there has been federal
registration but no local use, the grant of rights for these
purposes can be tempered by remedial rules (driven by the
consumer confusion rationale) that protect local goodwill. Thus,
in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.,304 the Second
Circuit denied injunctive relief to a senior user with rights that,
by virtue of federal registration, were nationwide. Confusion
would have arisen if goods of both parties had been sold in the

299. Refer to notes 13–31 supra and accompanying text.
300. Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a
Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 374 (4th Cir. 2003) (agreeing that “use in commerce” is necessary
for protection under the Lanham Act); id. at 388 (Motz, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s position as inconsistent with the principle of territoriality).
301. See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(rejecting argument based on the world economy).
302. See Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 381 (“[T]he dissent fears that we are undoing all
of the good of our country’s trademark laws. . . . [A]voidance of consumer confusion is the
ultimate end of all trademark law, this case presents a paradigmatic situation in which
we may see our laws working . . . to reduce consumer confusion.”).
303. Refer to text accompanying notes 36–42 supra (discussing Lanham Act
constructive notice reforms).
304. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
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same region, but relief was denied because the senior user had no
plans to enter the market where the injunction was sought.305
Although the court recognized the superior rights of the senior
user, which were sufficient therefore to offer the senior user the
certainty in the national market that registration confers, it also
sought to protect the goodwill that had developed in a particular
306
locale.
Despite these criticisms of tying rights to the territorial
scope of goodwill, there does appear to be a trend toward the
grant of rights on a broader geographic scale without the burden
of registration. If this trend continues, the remedial lesson of
Dawn Donut will be even more valuable in the future. As rights
expand into a variety of countries, a greater number of conflicts
will arise and nuanced remedies may indeed be the only means of
reconciling competing interests.
The Internet has of course been a leading cause of these
increased conflicts. In this context, the Joint Recommendation on
Internet Use is extremely important. In particular, national
courts should be hesitant to find use on a global basis and should
in any event be sensitive to competing interests in devising
remedies. Similar lessons are to be drawn from the approach of
the Second Circuit in Sterling Drug, where, in the inverse setting
of U.S. rights extruding to regulate conduct abroad, the court was
cognizant of the inevitable, but reconcilable, conflicts that
307
globalization generates. That court was clearly aware not only
of changes in the intrinsic territoriality of goodwill, but also of
those aspects of territoriality rooted in national political
sovereignty and the unspoken limits of the court’s enforcement
authority outside the United States.
2. Tying Trademark Rights to the Territoriality of Desired
Economic Expansion. As commerce moves from the national to
the global level, we could begin to develop the possibility of
unitary regional or global trademark rights; of course, the latter
is a utopian dream. That is, we might seek trademark rights on a
broader geographic basis in order to facilitate commerce on a
broader geographic scale and use trademark law as an

305. Id. at 364–65 (denying injunctive relief because “there was no reasonable
expectation that plaintiff would extend its retail operations into defendant’s trading area”
and thus cause consumer confusion).
306. Id. at 363–64 (concluding that no likelihood of confusion existed as a result of
defendant’s use of the mark in distinct geographic regions).
307. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 750 (2d Cir. 1994) (directing the
district court to “redraw . . . the injunction to accommodate [defendant’s] global business
interests”).
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instrument of economic policy. This is the rationale that
encouraged the development of the CTM as the EU sought to
develop a unified trading area. And it drove the Lanham Act
notion of constructive nationwide notice as trade within the
United States became more national.
Whereas the option discussed above privileged the social
dimension to territoriality by tying rights to goodwill, this
approach would emphasize those aspects of trademark
territoriality grounded in economic expansion. Such an emphasis
radically affects the viability of this approach. The development
of unitary regional or global trademark rights would encounter
substantial institutional and enforcement issues. The transition
from local to national rights in the United States in 1946 did not
present concerns about political sovereignty and enforcement
power. In 1946, the shift effected was from rights that were
subnational to rights that were national. Political institutions
operated at both levels, and the relationship between them was
constitutionally articulated. Although the Lanham Act
accommodated local interstate rights within a national system, it
never confronted rights that transcended U.S. national borders.
Likewise, the quasi-federal political institutions of the European
Union were an essential feature of the move to an EU-wide right
in the form of the CTM.308 At present, genuine political
institutions do not exist at the global level and are unlikely to
exist in the near future. And the relationships between nationstates and those international intellectual property institutions
that do exist (such as the WTO or WIPO) are too contingent to
serve as substitutes without substantial modification.309 Thus,
because the structure of economic policymaking reflects
territorial notions that have not adapted to global markets in
ways that permit an analogy to the enactment of the Lanham Act
or the CTM, tying trademark rights to the territorial scope of
desired economic expansion presently seems unworkable.

308. The existence of regional political institutions in Europe clearly facilitated the
creation of a unitary trademark right valid throughout the European Union, rather than
a national model of twenty-five separate national rights. There is evidence that looser
international arrangements might, on occasion, be sufficient to achieve similar objectives,
such as when the Benelux (or Andean Pact) countries created their regional trademarks,
but some institutional arrangement is necessary.
309. In addition, we would need to consider the different ways in which to
accommodate local uses by other than global registration; the Lanham Act and the EU
CTM Regulation adopted different solutions to this question. Incorporating some aspects
of the first option presented above by linking enforceability of rights explicitly to the scope
of goodwill would accommodate the local trader where a separate local goodwill existed.
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3. Tying Trademark Rights to the Territoriality of Existing
(National) Political Units. We have seen problems both with
coupling trademark rights unreservedly to fast-changing social
patterns and with moving the model of trademark law to the
levels of desired economic expansion in advance of the necessary
political institutions. We are thus left with efforts that take the
national model as the starting point for more targeted reform.
The practicalities of the national model and its nexus to
industrial policy suggest adhering to the basic premise of
national rights but seeking to minimize the costs and
inefficiencies of national acquisition and enforcement. That is,
rather than seek to revise the territorial aspects of trademark
rights or trademark law norms, a different strategy might focus
on the procedural aspects of the trademark system.
As seen in Part III, recent developments suggest a
commitment to facilitating the acquisition of registered national
rights on a broader basis. The acquisition mechanisms
(principally, the Madrid Protocol) have appeared to intrude
relatively little on the principle of territoriality because requests
for extension of protection in Madrid countries remain subject to
examination under different national laws by independent
national offices. The Madrid Protocol preserves national rights,
but it does so in a way that facilitates global trade. It may grant
rights in advance of trade, thus furthering some of the objectives
that might have been achieved by linking rights to the area of
desired economic expansion. But it does so in much the same way
as the telle quelle principle and constructive use and notice
under the Lanham Act, requiring minimal institutional
upheaval. And it facilitates global trade in ways that do not
create the costs generated by a slew of unregistered rights
protected in countries where a mark has not been used.
Efforts to effect parallel efficiencies in the enforcement of
national rights have encountered substantial opposition. As
demonstrated both by the decision of the Fourth Circuit in
Barcelona.com and the impasse in the Hague negotiations, the
historical and political obstacles that have prevented domestic
enforcement of foreign rights in the U.S. courts (whether under
U.S. law or through adjudication of foreign law claims) remain
310
National institutions will, for the
firmly entrenched.
310. The device of litigating claims through § 44 and Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention would not implicate the reluctance to adjudicate foreign law claims because
the conduct at issue would be alleged to violate international norms. U.S. courts already
refer to international standards in applying such statutes as the Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Enlarging the scope of a
defendant’s conduct that might give rise to a cause of action under the Lanham Act might

(6)DINWOODIEG5

2004]

10/11/2004 12:02 PM

TRADEMARKS AND TERRITORY

967

foreseeable future, remain the location for and instruments of
enforcement.311
Yet arguments grounded in judicial competence surely carry
much less weight when almost all countries are now developing a
trademark
jurisprudence
and
international
trademark
agreements are effecting a convergence of national rules. As seen
in recent Second Circuit case law on the doctrine of foreign
equivalents, value can be gained from reference to foreign
312
determinations. Indeed, formal reference procedures could be
developed for those circumstances in which foreign views have
not yet been articulated.
Concerns about offending foreign nations in adjudicating
trademark claims are also overstated.313 At bottom, trademark
infringement is a tort and should be treated as such for the
purposes of private international law and consolidation of
national claims. To be sure, any decision regarding trademark
validity effects a regulation of the economy in which the alleged
infringement occurred. But in a world where different economies
inevitably interact, conflicting decisions by national courts under
national law can have close to global effect. Foreign decisions
(purportedly with national effect) in the recent dispute between
Microsoft and Lindows.com had evident effects in the United
States.314 Producers who wish to market their goods on a global
basis may find that national courts are in effect passing on the
validity (or at least the commercial value) of trademarks issued
create some higher degree of uncertainty for those who act in commerce. But, to the
extent that an unfair competition action under Article 10bis rested on a more subjective
notion of liability than trademark rights proper, this would be less troublesome.
311. Not all theorists would understand a decision by U.S. courts to respect foreign
rights in some circumstances (as suggested by the district court in Barcelona.com) to
involve the application of foreign law. Indeed, as explained by Walter Wheeler Cook in his
theory of “local law,” even a decision to apply foreign law could be conceptualized as a
decision by the United States to make use of foreign determinations when it thought it
necessary to serve U.S. interests. See generally WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1949). That is to say, this is a sovereign
decision of the United States.
312. See Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 1999)
(considering Japanese Patent Office’s finding that mark was generic); Orto Conserviera
Sameranese di Giacchetti Marino & C. v. Bioconserve S.R.L., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 2013, 2014–
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (relying on foreign usage to determine if a mark was generic).
313. The notion that foreign trademark actions cannot be tried without risk of
offending the rights-issuing state is arguably belied by increasing arbitration of
international trademark disputes. But such decisions only operate inter partes. Giving
only inter partes effect to a finding of noninfringement or infringement in a trademark
action might in fact have an effect erga omnes because of the relationship between third
party uses and a mark’s distinctiveness.
314. See Elliot Spagat, Lindows Changes Name of Operating System to Linspire, USA
TODAY, Apr. 14, 2004, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/techcorporatenews/
2004-04-14-lindows-to-linspire_x.htm.
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in another country.
An alternative approach to the difficulties of enforcement in
interdependent markets, which might be pursued by parties
frustrated by the lack of consolidation mechanisms, is to seek
application of U.S. law extraterritorially in a greater range of
circumstances. The Sterling Drug opinion reflects the view that
global markets require a more flexible approach to
extraterritoriality in order to protect American consumer
interests fully.315 The district court’s decision in Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,316 in which the
court ordered an Italian website to restrict access by American
consumers, might also be viewed in this light, although the
court’s analysis in that case was not cast in the language of
extraterritoriality.317
However, both the Sterling Drug and Playboy courts
exhibited keen attention to a variable that will be crucial to
ensuring that such expansionist tendencies do not interfere with
other countries’ interests and prompt retaliatory action—the
nature of relief. In both cases, the courts sought to craft
injunctive relief that was not fully prohibitory with respect to the
defendant’s conduct in the foreign country. Such inquiries should
be expected to become more common, as is recognized by the
commendable Joint Recommendation on Internet Use, which
counsels against global prohibitory injunctions on the Internet.318
Absent this caution, enforcement of extraterritorial decisions will
become vulnerable without a recognition treaty (which is not
likely to happen).319 In an era of global and digital exchange, a
315. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer, 14 F.3d 733, 746–47 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting
Vanity Fair’s strict adherence to extraterritoriality principle).
316. 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
317. Id. at 1039–40 (acknowledging that a U.S. court cannot prohibit creation or
maintenance of infringing sites around the world, but can “prohibit access to those sites in
[the United States]”).
318. Joint Recommendation on Internet Use, supra note 194, art. 15.
319. Judgments with potential extraterritorial effects have in the past relied upon
existing U.S. jurisdiction over the defendant, see Playboy, 939 F. Supp. at 1040 (“While
this Court has neither the jurisdiction nor the desire to prohibit the creation of Internet
sites around the globe, it may prohibit access to those sites in this country.”), or
jurisdiction over the person with physical control of the means of implementing the relief
abroad (an occurrence that is mostly restricted to the Internet). In Globalsantafe Corp. v.
GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003), the plaintiff trademark owner
obtained an order from the Eastern District of Virginia, exercising in rem jurisdiction,
directing a Korean registrar to transfer a confusingly similar domain name in the “.com”
domain (for which the registry was based in Virginia) to the trademark owner. Id. at 612.
The Korean domain name registrant responded by obtaining an order from the Korean
courts directing the Korean registrar not to comply with the order of the U.S. court (on
the grounds that Korean choice of law rules identified the law of the server as the
applicable law and thus U.S. courts should not have applied U.S. law to the case). Id.
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central question for trademark law is how to accommodate an
increased number of competing interests, which is most subtly
and efficiently pursued through careful attention to remedies.
V. TERRITORIALITY AND NATIONALITY
As Part IV suggests, the appropriateness of the leading
developments discussed in Part III may turn on whether one
seeks to effectuate the intrinsic consumer protection purposes of
trademark law or (additionally) to develop trademark law
instrumentally as a tool of economic policy to equip domestic
producers to compete in global markets. A subsidiary theme,
however, in that and other debates, is the relationship between
territoriality and nationality.
As the discussion in Parts II and III demonstrates, U.S.
courts have consistently recognized that the rules applicable to
two remote users within the United States are different from
those that govern the competing rights of a senior user outside
the United States and a later user who is the first to use within
the United States. Because rights in the United States cannot be
acquired by use outside the United States, the later user within
the United States will—as the only user in the United States—be
afforded substantial latitude before it risks losing a priority
contest with the foreign user.320 Thus, the later U.S. user starts
as the senior user and the presumptive rightholder, subject to
narrow exceptions, whereas the later user in an internal U.S.
dispute will only have rights if the later user satisfies strict
requirements of good faith, remoteness, and use prior to federal
registration.321
When the Korean registrar chose to comply with the Korean court order rather than the
U.S. court order, the plaintiff then sought an order against Verisign (the registry for the
.com domain) compelling it to disable the domain name registration in question. Id. The
court granted the relief sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 626–27; see also Am. Online, Inc. v.
AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455–57 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that the court had power—
in circumstances similar to Globalsantafe, but without a competing court order—to order
the registry to transfer the infringing domain name registration even if that conduct
might be in violation of the agreements between the registrar that had refused to comply
with the U.S. court decision and the registry).
320. See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (denying
foreign plaintiff priority for a mark used inside the United States first by a domestic
producer).
321. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101 (1918).
“[W]here two parties . . . are employing the same mark . . . in separate markets
wholly remote the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is
legally insignificant, unless at least it appear that the second adopter has
selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the first
user . . . .”
Id. (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916)).
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This distinction can be explained on several different
grounds, and the explanation chosen may affect whether one
accepts the need to revise trademark law in light of globalization
322
(or the possibility of doing so). Nationality might be regarded as
a good proxy for territoriality if markets, and thus consumer
understanding, were always national. That is, one might simply
treat the international rule as implementation of an assumption
that foreign markets are remote and that the local producer, who
would have no expectation that the foreign producer would
expand into the United States, acts in good faith.323
Conceptualized in these terms, which are grounded very much in
universal trademark teleology rather than in notions of political
authority or national industrial policy, the advent of
globalization and world markets would throw the distinction
between the internal and cross-border scenarios into considerable
doubt. The stated assumptions hold up in many fewer cases, such
that the arguments for a rule of law flowing from them seem
weak.324
However, global trading may warrant a lesser revision of the
different treatment of domestic and international priority
contests if we explain that distinction on other grounds. For
example, if we posit the distinction between domestic and
international priority contests as reflecting the prescriptive reach
(normative or descriptive) of the national political authorities
that accord trademark rights, the emergence of global markets
322. This dilemma concerning competing rationales for territorial rules is not new.
Justice Holmes, in dicta in his concurring opinion in Hanover Star Milling, elevated the
importance of political boundaries. See Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 426 (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (“I do not believe that a trade-mark established in Chicago could be used by a
competitor in some other part of Illinois on the ground that it was not known there.”).
Justice Holmes’s view might have been defensible on the grounds that markets typically
encompassed the reach of the state, rendering both good faith and discrete goodwill
implausible conclusions. Or it might reflect pragmatic concerns about the need for
certainty, reflected more directly in statewide or nationwide benefits of registration. But
it might also reflect a bare assertion of the link between political sovereignty and property
rights, and that would appear to be a stronger element in Justice Holmes’s analysis. See
id. at 424-25 (Holmes, J., concurring).
323. One could view the good faith standard in Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at
415—“unless at least it appear that the second adopter has selected the mark with some
design inimical to the interests of the first user, such as . . . to forestall the extension of
his trade, or the like”—as similar to the standard articulated in Person’s in the
international context. The application of that (common) standard before the
commencement of global trade would have afforded quite different results in the domestic
and international setting. Trade was more likely to extend within the United States. But
such differences might be somewhat smaller today. If, instead, one viewed the legal
standards as different because of pragmatic concerns grounded in economic policy then
the shift toward global trade will be of less significance.
324. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 993–94 (1995)
(discussing when rules are more appropriate than standards).

(6)DINWOODIEG5

2004]

10/11/2004 12:02 PM

TRADEMARKS AND TERRITORY

971

has little to say about the revision of the “territorial” rules of
trademark law absent the creation of global political institutions.
Finally, the distinction may rest instead on the practical
concerns of nations that a ready supply of marks be available to
their producers and that the cost of clearing marks not become
prohibitive because of conflicting international marks. Despite
the readier access to information about foreign registers, which
might make searching easier, if the distinction were based on
this rationale it likewise would not require revision because of
international trade. But the distinction, so based, might be more
susceptible to change in the event that social developments cause
a reassessment of the availability of marks.
It would be helpful, however, if courts and scholars would
recognize the assimilation and its significance. When territorial
rules flow from nationally grounded concerns such as economic
policy or political sovereignty, they are likely to be subject to a
more cautious reassessment. Policymaking and political
institutions have retained their national configuration even in
the face of globalization. That is to say, the assimilation of
territoriality and nationality in debates about the issues
discussed in this paper is in fact an unspoken decision to prefer
only one aspect of territoriality or to pursue a particular set of
trademark objectives (i.e., those that reflect political sovereignty
or economic policy).
VI. CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of globalization presents a variety of
challenges to U.S. courts and international policymakers. In the
face of such challenges, they are arguably reconfiguring the
doctrines of territoriality for a new age. But the considerations
that lead to one solution over another are often unstated. Mere
reference to “the principle of territoriality” in support of a
particular position is insufficient because the principle is not
unitary. It is simply impossible to say that “the principle” is
either outdated or unnecessary to change.
Whether trademark law can be detached from its territorial
moorings and the nation-state is not simply a function of whether
consumer or producer activity still conforms to the territorial
boundaries of the nation-state. That consideration, grounded in
social and commercial practices, reflects only that part of the
territoriality principle intrinsic to the purposes of trademark law,
namely, extending (and limiting) trademark rights to the
geographic reach of goodwill.
A fuller assessment of the linkage between trademark law
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and the nation-state requires a broader understanding of why
the principle of territoriality dominates trademark law. In
particular, complementary objectives of trademark law, such as
the promotion of economic expansion and the effective
enforcement of rights, have also often been viewed through a
territorial lens. But the devices used to pursue these objectives
derive their territorial character from their grounding in
economic policymaking or political institutions rather than social
practices.
Thus, the resilience of the “principle of territoriality” can be
properly assessed only by considering both those aspects of
trademark law grounded in the intrinsic purposes of trademark
law and those that assume their territorial character because of
their connection to economic policy or political institutions.
In an era of global trade and digital communication, social
and commercial practices are less territorially confined and less
concordant with the nation-state. But economic policymaking and
political institutions may prove more resistant to change than
social behavior. Nationally rooted aspects of territoriality, such
as enforcement, will make the transition from the nation-state
only when the institutional structure allows it. Thus, under the
UDRP, effective global relief can be obtained based upon
territorial rights. But it is the technological control that ICANN
exercises over the domain name system that enables the UDRP
to move beyond the national enforcement model. It is one of the
rare circumstances in which the policymaking and political
structures, which normally sustain national models of
enforcement, have evolved from the nation-state in ways that
allow a loosening of nationally rooted notions of territoriality.
It might also be useful to think explicitly about the role of
the nation-state in trademark law, especially in an era in which
goodwill is geographically shapeless. It might be tempting to
reflect socially driven, nonnational notions of territoriality in
order to vindicate the basic purpose of trademark law, but
ultimately the national political authorities will be important for
the purposes of enforcement and will also have a legitimate role
to play in interjecting concerns of industrial policy that might
temper full commitment to socially constructed territories.
Nation-states have not yet found a way, and are not likely in the
near future to find a way, to create the global political
institutions that are necessary for the formulation and
enforcement of global trademark rights. Instead, the primary
value of the state in this context lies in its adjudicatory and
enforcement authority. This does not mean that the scope of
rights that a state enforces need be coincident with its political
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authority, although to exceed that authority may create problems
of enforcement. But it does mean that, whatever deviation from
political authority in favor of social boundaries might be justified
by the intrinsic purpose of trademark law, the continuing role of
national authorities requires that attention also be paid to the
national political objectives of economic expansion and
commercial certainty. This was true in the shift from local to
national markets, and it will also be true in a move toward global
markets, regardless of the actual boundaries of goodwill.

